mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
75 lines
2.2 KiB
Markdown
75 lines
2.2 KiB
Markdown
# Workflows - Detecting Evasion Techniques in Endpoint Logs
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## Workflow 1: Evasion Technique Threat Hunt
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```
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[Select evasion technique to hunt]
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│
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├── T1055 Process Injection
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├── T1070 Log Tampering
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├── T1036 Masquerading
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├── T1562 Security Tool Disabling
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│
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▼
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[Craft detection query (Splunk/KQL/Elastic)]
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│
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▼
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[Execute across 30-90 days of endpoint telemetry]
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│
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▼
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[Triage results]
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│
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├── Known-good (allowlist) ──► [Add to baseline, refine query]
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├── Suspicious ──► [Deep investigation]
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│ │
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│ ├── Correlate with other telemetry
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│ ├── Check process tree
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│ ├── Review network connections
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│ │
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│ ├── True positive ──► [Escalate to IR]
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│ └── False positive ──► [Tune detection]
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│
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└── No results ──► [Validate logging covers technique]
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```
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## Workflow 2: Detection Rule Deployment
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```
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[Create Sigma/SIEM detection rule]
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│
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▼
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[Test against historical data]
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│
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├── High false positive rate ──► [Refine exclusions]
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│
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└── Acceptable FP rate ──► [Deploy in alert mode]
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│
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▼
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[Monitor for 2 weeks]
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│
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▼
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[Review alert quality]
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│
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▼
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[Promote to production detection]
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```
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## Workflow 3: Evasion Incident Response
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```
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[Evasion technique detected]
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│
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▼
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[Assess scope: Which endpoints affected?]
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│
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▼
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[Correlate with initial access and persistence]
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│
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▼
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[Determine if adversary achieved objectives]
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│
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├── Active intrusion ──► [Full incident response]
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│
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└── Isolated event ──► [Remediate endpoint, enhance detection]
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```
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