mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
1.6 KiB
1.6 KiB
DCSync Attack Detection Hunt Template
Hunt Metadata
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Hunt ID | TH-DCSYNC-YYYY-MM-DD-NNN |
| Analyst | |
| Date | |
| Status | [ ] In Progress / [ ] Complete |
Hypothesis
An adversary with elevated AD privileges is performing DCSync to extract password hashes from Active Directory by replicating directory data from a non-domain-controller machine.
Pre-Hunt Checklist
- Event ID 4662 audit policy enabled on all DCs
- SACL configured on domain root object
- Domain controller inventory documented
- Known service accounts with replication rights documented
- Azure AD Connect accounts identified (if hybrid)
DCSync Detection Findings
| # | Timestamp | Subject Account | Source Machine | Target DC | Replication Rights | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 |
Accounts with Replication Rights Audit
| Account | Type | Rights | Legitimate | Justification |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| User/Service/Computer | Get-Changes / Get-Changes-All | Yes/No |
Post-DCSync Impact Assessment
| Check | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| KRBTGT hash potentially compromised | ||
| Domain Admin hashes extracted | ||
| Service account credentials at risk | ||
| Golden Ticket creation possible |
Response Actions
- Disable: [Compromised accounts]
- Reset: [KRBTGT password -- twice, 12 hours apart]
- Revoke: [Unauthorized replication rights]
- Investigate: [Source machine forensics]
- Monitor: [Subsequent credential abuse attempts]