Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

99 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown

# Credential Dumping Detection API Reference
## Sysmon Event ID 10 - ProcessAccess
### Key Fields
```
SourceImage - Process accessing LSASS
SourceProcessId - PID of accessing process
TargetImage - Should be C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe
GrantedAccess - Access rights bitmask
CallTrace - DLL call stack of the access
```
### Suspicious GrantedAccess Values
| Value | Meaning | Tool Association |
|-------|---------|-----------------|
| 0x1010 | VM_READ + QUERY_LIMITED | Mimikatz |
| 0x1410 | VM_READ + QUERY_INFO | ProcDump |
| 0x1FFFFF | PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS | Various dumpers |
| 0x1438 | VM_READ + QUERY + DUP_HANDLE | Cobalt Strike |
| 0x40 | DUP_HANDLE only | Handle duplication |
## Sysmon Event ID 1 - Process Creation
### Command Line Patterns for Credential Theft
```
# SAM hive export
reg save hklm\sam C:\temp\sam.hiv
reg save hklm\security C:\temp\security.hiv
reg save hklm\system C:\temp\system.hiv
# comsvcs.dll LSASS dump
rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump <lsass_pid> dump.bin full
# NTDS.dit extraction
ntdsutil "activate instance ntds" ifm "create full C:\temp"
vssadmin create shadow /for=C:
```
## Splunk SPL Queries
### LSASS Access Detection
```spl
index=sysmon EventCode=10 TargetImage="*\\lsass.exe"
GrantedAccess IN ("0x1010","0x1FFFFF","0x1410","0x1438")
SourceImage!="*\\csrss.exe" SourceImage!="*\\svchost.exe"
| stats count by SourceImage, GrantedAccess, Computer, User
| sort -count
```
### comsvcs.dll MiniDump Detection
```spl
index=sysmon EventCode=1
(CommandLine="*comsvcs*MiniDump*" OR CommandLine="*comsvcs*#24*")
| table _time, Computer, User, ParentImage, CommandLine
```
### SAM/SECURITY Hive Export
```spl
index=sysmon EventCode=1 Image="*\\reg.exe"
(CommandLine="*save*hklm\\sam*" OR CommandLine="*save*hklm\\security*")
| table _time, Computer, User, CommandLine
```
## Elastic / KQL Queries
### LSASS Access in Elastic
```kql
event.code: "10" AND
winlog.event_data.TargetImage: *lsass.exe AND
winlog.event_data.GrantedAccess: ("0x1010" OR "0x1FFFFF")
```
### Process Creation with Credential Theft Commands
```kql
event.code: "1" AND
(process.command_line: *comsvcs*MiniDump* OR
process.command_line: *reg*save*hklm\\sam*)
```
## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| Sub-technique | ID | Detection Method |
|---|---|---|
| LSASS Memory | T1003.001 | Sysmon EID 10 GrantedAccess |
| Security Account Manager | T1003.002 | reg.exe save commands |
| NTDS | T1003.003 | ntdsutil / vssadmin commands |
| DCSync | T1003.006 | Event ID 4662 with replication GUIDs |
## CLI Usage
```bash
# Analyze Sysmon XML export
python agent.py --sysmon-xml sysmon_events.xml --output cred_report.json
# Print Splunk detection queries
python agent.py --show-splunk
```