mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 08:30:20 +00:00
24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
65 lines
2.5 KiB
Markdown
65 lines
2.5 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: detecting-credential-dumping-techniques
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description: Detect LSASS credential dumping, SAM database extraction, and NTDS.dit theft using Sysmon Event ID 10, Windows
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Security logs, and SIEM correlation rules
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: threat-detection
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tags:
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- credential-dumping
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- lsass
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- mimikatz
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- sysmon
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- active-directory
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- windows-security
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- defense-evasion
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version: '1.0'
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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d3fend_techniques:
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- Token Binding
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- Execution Isolation
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- File Metadata Consistency Validation
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- Restore Access
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- Application Protocol Command Analysis
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nist_csf:
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- DE.CM-01
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- DE.AE-02
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- DE.AE-06
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- ID.RA-05
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---
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# Detecting Credential Dumping Techniques
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## Overview
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Credential dumping (MITRE ATT&CK T1003) is a post-exploitation technique where adversaries extract authentication credentials from OS memory, registry hives, or domain controller databases. This skill covers detection of LSASS memory access via Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess), SAM registry hive export via reg.exe, NTDS.dit extraction via ntdsutil/vssadmin, and comsvcs.dll MiniDump abuse. Detection rules analyze GrantedAccess bitmasks, suspicious calling processes, and known tool signatures.
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## When to Use
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- When investigating security incidents that require detecting credential dumping techniques
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- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
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- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
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- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
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## Prerequisites
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- Sysmon v14+ deployed with ProcessAccess logging (Event ID 10) for lsass.exe
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- Windows Security audit policy enabling process creation (Event ID 4688) with command line logging
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- Splunk or Elastic SIEM ingesting Sysmon and Windows Security logs
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- Python 3.8+ for log analysis
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## Steps
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1. Configure Sysmon to log ProcessAccess events targeting lsass.exe
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2. Forward Sysmon Event ID 10 and Windows Event ID 4688 to SIEM
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3. Create detection rules for known GrantedAccess patterns (0x1010, 0x1FFFFF)
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4. Detect comsvcs.dll MiniDump and procdump.exe targeting LSASS PID
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5. Alert on reg.exe SAM/SECURITY/SYSTEM hive export commands
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6. Detect ntdsutil/vssadmin shadow copy creation for NTDS.dit theft
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7. Correlate detections with user/host context for risk scoring
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## Expected Output
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JSON report containing detected credential dumping indicators with technique classification, severity ratings, process details, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, and Splunk/Elastic detection queries.
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