mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 08:30:20 +00:00
24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
65 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
65 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
# Falco Container Escape Detection Runbook
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## Alert Triage Template
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### Alert Details
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| Field | Value |
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|-------|-------|
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| Alert Time | |
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| Rule Name | |
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| Priority | |
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| Container Name | |
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| Container Image | |
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| Pod Name | |
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| Namespace | |
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| Node | |
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| User | |
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| Process Command | |
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| MITRE Technique | |
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## Triage Steps
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### Immediate Actions (0-5 minutes)
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- [ ] Acknowledge alert in SIEM/SOAR
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- [ ] Verify alert is not a false positive (check known exceptions list)
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- [ ] Identify the affected pod and node
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- [ ] Check if the container is still running
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### Investigation (5-30 minutes)
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- [ ] Capture pod spec: `kubectl get pod <name> -n <ns> -o yaml`
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- [ ] Review container security context
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- [ ] Check if container is privileged
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- [ ] Review mounted volumes for host paths
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- [ ] Examine process tree from Falco output
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- [ ] Check for other alerts from same container/node
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- [ ] Review Kubernetes audit logs for the same timeframe
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### Containment (if confirmed)
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- [ ] Isolate pod with network policy deny-all
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- [ ] Cordon affected node: `kubectl cordon <node>`
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- [ ] Capture forensic data from container
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- [ ] Kill compromised container: `kubectl delete pod <name> -n <ns>`
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- [ ] Review other pods on same node for compromise
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### Recovery
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- [ ] Scan node for rootkits
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- [ ] Rebuild node if compromise confirmed
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- [ ] Patch vulnerable container image
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- [ ] Update network policies
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- [ ] Uncordon node after verification
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## False Positive Exceptions
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| Container Image | Rule | Justification | Approved By | Date |
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|----------------|------|---------------|-------------|------|
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## Escalation Matrix
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| Priority | Response Time | Notify |
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|----------|--------------|--------|
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| CRITICAL | Immediate | Security On-Call + Engineering Lead |
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| WARNING | 15 minutes | Security On-Call |
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| NOTICE | 1 hour | Security Team queue |
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| INFO | Next business day | Review in daily standup |
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