mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
67 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
67 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: detecting-azure-storage-account-misconfigurations
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description: Audit Azure Blob and ADLS storage accounts for public access exposure, weak or long-lived SAS tokens, missing
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encryption at rest, disabled HTTPS-only traffic, and outdated TLS versions using the azure-mgmt-storage Python SDK.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: cloud-security
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tags:
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- Azure
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- storage-accounts
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- blob-storage
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- ADLS
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- SAS-tokens
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- encryption
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- public-access
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- cloud-misconfiguration
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- azure-mgmt-storage
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version: '1.0'
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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nist_ai_rmf:
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- MEASURE-2.7
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- MAP-5.1
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- MANAGE-2.4
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atlas_techniques:
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- AML.T0070
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- AML.T0066
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- AML.T0082
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nist_csf:
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- PR.IR-01
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- ID.AM-08
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- GV.SC-06
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- DE.CM-01
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---
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# Detecting Azure Storage Account Misconfigurations
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## Overview
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Azure Storage accounts are a frequent target for attackers due to misconfigured public access, long-lived SAS tokens, missing encryption, and outdated TLS versions. This skill uses the azure-mgmt-storage Python SDK with StorageManagementClient to enumerate all storage accounts in a subscription, inspect their security properties, list blob containers for public access settings, and generate a risk-scored audit report identifying critical misconfigurations.
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## When to Use
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- When investigating security incidents that require detecting azure storage account misconfigurations
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- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
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- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
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- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
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## Prerequisites
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- Python 3.9+ with `azure-mgmt-storage`, `azure-identity`
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- Azure service principal with Reader role on target subscription
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- Environment variables: AZURE_CLIENT_ID, AZURE_TENANT_ID, AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET, AZURE_SUBSCRIPTION_ID
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## Key Detection Areas
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1. **Public blob access** — `allow_blob_public_access` enabled on storage account or individual containers set to Blob/Container access level
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2. **HTTPS enforcement** — `enable_https_traffic_only` disabled, allowing unencrypted HTTP traffic
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3. **Minimum TLS version** — accounts accepting TLS 1.0 or TLS 1.1 instead of minimum TLS 1.2
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4. **Encryption at rest** — storage service encryption not enabled or missing customer-managed keys
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5. **Network rules** — default action set to Allow instead of Deny, exposing storage to all networks
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6. **SAS token risks** — account-level SAS with overly broad permissions or excessive lifetime
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## Output
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JSON report with per-account findings, severity ratings (Critical/High/Medium/Low), and remediation recommendations aligned with CIS Azure Benchmark controls.
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