mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 08:30:20 +00:00
24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
55 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
55 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
# SCADA Attack Detection — API Reference
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## Libraries
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| Library | Install | Purpose |
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|---------|---------|---------|
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| pymodbus | `pip install pymodbus` | Modbus TCP client for PLC interaction |
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| requests | `pip install requests` | SIEM and historian API queries |
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## Common SCADA Protocols and Ports
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| Port | Protocol | Vendor/Use |
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|------|----------|------------|
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| 502 | Modbus TCP | Universal PLC communication |
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| 102 | S7comm (ISO-TSAP) | Siemens S7 PLCs |
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| 44818 | EtherNet/IP CIP | Allen-Bradley / Rockwell |
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| 20000 | DNP3 | Power grid, water systems |
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| 4840 | OPC-UA | Universal ICS integration |
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| 47808 | BACnet | Building automation |
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| 34962 | PROFINET RT | Siemens distributed I/O |
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## Modbus Attack Indicators
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| Indicator | Description | Severity |
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|-----------|-------------|----------|
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| Broadcast unit ID (0/255) | Access to all devices simultaneously | CRITICAL |
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| Write to coils from IT network | Unauthorized process control change | CRITICAL |
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| Unusual function codes (8, 17, 43) | Diagnostic/recon commands | HIGH |
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| Bulk register reads | Data exfiltration from PLC memory | MEDIUM |
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## S7comm Connection Request (COTP CR)
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| Field | Value | Description |
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|-------|-------|-------------|
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| TPKT version | 0x03 | ISO transport header |
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| COTP PDU type | 0xe0 | Connection request |
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| Source TSAP | 0x0100 | Client address |
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| Destination TSAP | 0x0102 | PLC rack/slot |
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## MITRE ATT&CK for ICS
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| Technique | ID | Description |
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|-----------|----|-------------|
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| Point & Tag Identification | T0861 | Enumerate process data points |
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| Unauthorized Command Message | T0855 | Send rogue commands to controller |
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| Modify Controller Tasking | T0821 | Change PLC program logic |
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| Denial of Service | T0814 | Disrupt SCADA communications |
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## External References
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- [pymodbus Documentation](https://pymodbus.readthedocs.io/)
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- [MITRE ATT&CK for ICS](https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/ics/)
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- [CISA ICS Advisories](https://www.cisa.gov/ics-advisories)
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- [NIST SP 800-82 Rev 3](https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-82/rev-3/final)
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