Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

82 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown

# Microsegmentation Implementation Plan Template
## Project Information
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Project Name | |
| Organization | |
| Project Lead | |
| Start Date | |
| Segmentation Tool | [Illumio / VMware NSX / Guardicore / Cisco ACI] |
## Workload Inventory
| Workload | IP Address | OS | Role | Application | Environment | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | web | | prod | |
| | | | app | | prod | |
| | | | db | | prod | |
## Segmentation Zone Design
### Zone Definitions
| Zone Name | Description | Workloads | Default Policy |
|---|---|---|---|
| PCI-CDE | Cardholder data environment | [list] | Deny-all |
| HR-Systems | HR applications | [list] | Deny-all |
| DMZ | Internet-facing services | [list] | Deny-all |
| Management | Admin/monitoring | [list] | Restricted |
### Inter-Zone Communication Matrix
| Source Zone | Destination Zone | Ports/Protocols | Justification |
|---|---|---|---|
| DMZ | App-Tier | 8080/tcp | Web application traffic |
| App-Tier | DB-Tier | 3306/tcp | Database queries |
| Management | All Zones | 22/tcp, 9090/tcp | SSH and monitoring |
## Policy Rules
### Allow Rules
| Rule ID | Source | Destination | Port | Protocol | Process | Justification |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | | | | tcp | | |
| 2 | | | | tcp | | |
### Default Deny
- All traffic not explicitly allowed is denied
- Deny rule logged and alerted
## Enforcement Schedule
| Week | Activity | Applications | Risk Level |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1-2 | Agent deployment and discovery | All | Low |
| 3-4 | Label assignment and validation | All | Low |
| 5-6 | Policy design and test mode | All | Low |
| 7 | Enforce: Dev/Test environments | Dev apps | Low |
| 8 | Enforce: Low-risk production | Non-critical | Medium |
| 9-10 | Enforce: Business-critical apps | ERP, CRM | High |
| 11-12 | Enforce: Regulated environments | PCI, HIPAA | High |
## Validation Tests
- [ ] Legitimate traffic flows uninterrupted after enforcement
- [ ] Unauthorized cross-zone traffic is blocked
- [ ] Lateral movement from compromised workload is contained
- [ ] Policy violation alerts appear in SIEM
- [ ] Break-glass procedure works for emergency access
- [ ] Application dependency map matches actual flows
## Sign-Off
| Stakeholder | Role | Approval | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Security Architecture | | |
| | Network Operations | | |
| | Application Owners | | |
| | Compliance/Audit | | |