Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

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1.2 KiB
Markdown

# Standards References - Post-Incident Lessons Learned
## NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 2 - Section 3.4 Post-Incident Activity
- 3.4.1: Lessons Learned meetings after each significant incident
- 3.4.2: Using Collected Incident Data for trending and metrics
- Recommends formal review within days of resolution
## NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3 - Continuous Improvement
- Recover (RC) function: Learning from incidents
- RC.CO-03: Recovery activities and progress communicated
- Emphasis on continuous improvement of IR capabilities
## SANS PICERL - Lessons Learned Phase
- Phase 6: Final phase of incident handling
- Formal review with all stakeholders
- Document improvements and update procedures
## MITRE ATT&CK - Detection Gap Analysis
- Map incident techniques to ATT&CK framework
- Identify detection gaps in current monitoring
- Develop new detection rules based on observed TTPs
## ISO 27001 - Clause 10: Improvement
- 10.1: Nonconformity and corrective action
- 10.2: Continual improvement
- Requires organizations to learn from security incidents
## Google SRE Post-Mortem Culture
- Blameless approach to incident review
- Focus on systemic issues rather than human error
- Document and share learnings broadly