mirror of https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git synced 2026-08-01 08:30:20 +00:00

Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure

Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c

2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

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Internal Network Penetration Test — Report Template

Document Control

Field	Value
Client	[Client Name]
Assessment Type	Internal Network Penetration Test
Access Model	Assumed Breach / Unauthenticated
Test Period	[Start] — [End]
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL

1. Executive Summary

Scope

Subnet(s): [Internal ranges]
Domain: [AD domain]
Starting Position: [Network drop location / VPN / credentials provided]

Key Findings

Severity	Count	Example
Critical	[N]	Domain compromise via credential relay
High	[N]	Kerberoastable service accounts with weak passwords
Medium	[N]	SMB signing disabled on file servers
Low	[N]	Excessive share permissions

Attack Path Summary

[Describe the primary attack chain from initial access to domain compromise]

2. Technical Findings

Finding [N]: [Title]

Attribute	Detail
Severity	[Critical/High/Medium/Low]
CVSS v3.1	[Score]
MITRE ATT&CK	[Technique ID]
Affected Assets	[Hosts/accounts]

Description: [Details] Steps to Reproduce: [Steps] Evidence: [Screenshots/logs] Remediation: [Fix]

3. Recommendations Priority

Priority	Action	Timeline
P1	Disable LLMNR/NBT-NS, enable SMB signing	1 week
P2	Deploy LAPS, implement tiered admin	30 days
P3	Enforce strong password policy	30 days
P4	Review share permissions	60 days

1.5 KiB Raw Blame History