24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2.4 KiB
API Reference: Cloud Incident Response Agent
Overview
Automates AWS cloud incident response: disables compromised access keys, attaches deny-all policies, isolates EC2 instances, captures EBS snapshots for forensics, and queries CloudTrail for attacker activity timeline.
Dependencies
| Package | Version | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| requests | >=2.28 | HTTP API calls |
| AWS CLI | >=2.0 | AWS service interaction (subprocess) |
CLI Usage
python agent.py --incident-id INC-2025-001 --username compromised-user \
--access-key-id AKIA... --instance-id i-0abc123 --output report.json
Arguments
| Argument | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
--incident-id |
Yes | Incident ticket identifier |
--username |
Yes | Compromised IAM username |
--access-key-id |
No | Access key ID to disable |
--instance-id |
No | EC2 instance ID to isolate |
--forensic-sg |
No | Forensic isolation security group ID |
--output |
No | Output report file path |
Key Functions
aws_disable_access_key(username, access_key_id)
Disables a compromised IAM access key by setting status to Inactive via aws iam update-access-key.
aws_attach_deny_all(username)
Attaches the AWSDenyAll managed policy to block all API calls from the compromised user.
aws_isolate_ec2(instance_id, forensic_sg)
Changes an EC2 instance's security groups to a forensic isolation group that denies all traffic.
aws_snapshot_ebs(instance_id)
Creates forensic snapshots of all EBS volumes attached to the compromised instance.
aws_query_cloudtrail(username, hours_back)
Queries CloudTrail for all API events made by the compromised identity, parsing source IP, user agent, and resources.
aws_list_attacker_resources(username, events)
Filters CloudTrail events for resource creation actions (Create*, Run*, Put*, Attach*).
aws_check_all_regions_instances()
Scans all AWS regions for running EC2 instances to detect crypto-mining deployments.
AWS CLI Commands Used
| Command | Purpose |
|---|---|
aws iam update-access-key |
Disable access key |
aws iam attach-user-policy |
Attach deny-all policy |
aws ec2 modify-instance-attribute |
Change security groups |
aws ec2 create-snapshot |
Capture EBS volume snapshot |
aws cloudtrail lookup-events |
Query API audit trail |
aws ec2 describe-regions |
List all regions |