mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-02 17:03:25 +00:00
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
94 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
94 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
# Workflows - Building Detection Rules with Splunk SPL
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## Detection Rule Development Workflow
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1. Identify Threat Scenario
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2. Map to MITRE ATT&CK Technique
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3. Identify Required Data Sources
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4. Validate Data Availability in Splunk
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5. Write Base SPL Query
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6. Add Aggregation and Filtering
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7. Add Enrichment (Lookups, Threat Intel)
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8. Test Against Historical Data
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9. Calculate False Positive Rate
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10. Deploy as Correlation Search
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11. Monitor Detection Metrics
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12. Tune and Iterate
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```
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## Rule Testing Workflow
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### Phase 1: Development
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- Write SPL query in Search & Reporting
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- Test with `earliest=-7d latest=now()`
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- Verify expected events are captured
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### Phase 2: Validation
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- Run Atomic Red Team tests to generate known-bad events
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- Confirm detection triggers on simulated attacks
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- Check no duplicate or redundant notable events generated
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### Phase 3: Tuning
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- Identify false positives from 7-day burn-in period
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- Add exclusions for known benign activity
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- Adjust thresholds based on environment baseline
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### Phase 4: Production
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- Schedule as correlation search in ES
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- Configure adaptive response actions
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- Set notable event severity and urgency mapping
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## Correlation Search Scheduling Guide
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| Rule Severity | Schedule Interval | Time Window |
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| Critical | Every 5 minutes | 10 minutes |
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| High | Every 15 minutes | 20 minutes |
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| Medium | Every 30 minutes | 35 minutes |
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| Low | Every 60 minutes | 65 minutes |
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| Informational | Every 4 hours | 4.5 hours |
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Note: Time window should slightly exceed schedule interval to prevent event gaps.
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## Alert Output Workflow
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Correlation Search Fires
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Notable Event Created in ES
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SOC Analyst Reviews in Incident Review Dashboard
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Analyst Triages: True Positive / False Positive / Needs Investigation
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True Positive --> Create Investigation --> Escalate if needed
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False Positive --> Document exclusion --> Update correlation search
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```
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