Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

2.9 KiB

name description domain subdomain tags version author license nist_csf
analyzing-malicious-pdf-with-peepdf Perform static analysis of malicious PDF documents using peepdf, pdfid, and pdf-parser to extract embedded JavaScript, shellcode, and suspicious objects. cybersecurity malware-analysis
malware-analysis
pdf
peepdf
pdfid
pdf-parser
static-analysis
reverse-engineering
dfir
1.0 mahipal Apache-2.0
DE.AE-02
RS.AN-03
ID.RA-01
DE.CM-01

Analyzing Malicious PDF with peepdf

When to Use

  • When triaging suspicious PDF attachments from phishing emails
  • During malware analysis of PDF-based exploit documents
  • When extracting embedded JavaScript, shellcode, or executables from PDFs
  • For forensic examination of weaponized document artifacts
  • When building detection signatures for PDF-based threats

Prerequisites

  • Python 3.8+ with peepdf-3 installed (pip install peepdf-3)
  • pdfid.py and pdf-parser.py from Didier Stevens suite
  • Isolated analysis environment (VM or sandbox)
  • Optional: PyV8 for JavaScript emulation within peepdf
  • Optional: Pylibemu for shellcode analysis

Workflow

  1. Triage with pdfid: Scan PDF for suspicious keywords (/JS, /JavaScript, /OpenAction, /Launch, /EmbeddedFile).
  2. Interactive Analysis: Open PDF in peepdf interactive mode to explore object structure.
  3. Identify Suspicious Objects: Locate objects containing JavaScript, streams, or encoded data.
  4. Extract Content: Dump suspicious streams and decode filters (FlateDecode, ASCIIHexDecode).
  5. Deobfuscate JavaScript: Analyze extracted JS for shellcode, heap sprays, or exploit code.
  6. Check VirusTotal: Use peepdf vtcheck to cross-reference file hash with AV detections.
  7. Generate IOCs: Extract URLs, domains, hashes, and shellcode signatures.

Key Concepts

Concept Description
/OpenAction Automatic action executed when PDF is opened
/JavaScript /JS Embedded JavaScript code in PDF objects
/Launch Action that launches external applications
/EmbeddedFile File embedded within the PDF structure
FlateDecode zlib compression filter used to hide content
Object Streams PDF objects stored in compressed streams

Tools & Systems

Tool Purpose
peepdf / peepdf-3 Interactive PDF analysis with JS emulation
pdfid.py Quick triage scanning for suspicious keywords
pdf-parser.py Deep object-level PDF parsing
VirusTotal Hash lookup and AV detection cross-reference
CyberChef Decode and transform extracted payloads

Output Format

Analysis Report: PDF-MAL-[DATE]-[SEQ]
File: [filename.pdf]
SHA-256: [hash]
Suspicious Keywords: [/JS, /OpenAction, etc.]
Objects with JavaScript: [Object IDs]
Extracted URLs: [List]
Shellcode Detected: [Yes/No]
Embedded Files: [Count and types]
VirusTotal Detections: [X/Y engines]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]