Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

84 lines
4.1 KiB
Markdown

# Workflows: iOS App Security with Objection
## Workflow 1: iOS Runtime Security Assessment
```
[Setup Environment] --> [Prepare Device] --> [Attach Objection] --> [Runtime Analysis]
| | | |
v v v v
[Install Frida] [Jailbroken: Start [Connect via USB] [Data Storage Check]
[Install Objection] frida-server] [Spawn target app] [Network Security]
[Non-JB: Patch IPA] [Auth Mechanism Review]
[Binary Protection Test]
|
v
[Document Findings]
[Generate Report]
```
## Workflow 2: SSL Pinning Bypass for Traffic Interception
```
[Configure Burp Proxy] --> [Set device proxy] --> [Attach Objection]
|
v
[ios sslpinning disable]
|
v
[Navigate app in browser/UI]
|
v
[Capture HTTPS traffic in Burp]
[Analyze API endpoints]
[Test authentication flows]
[Check for sensitive data in transit]
```
## Workflow 3: Keychain and Data Storage Assessment
```
[Attach Objection] --> [ios keychain dump] --> [Analyze keychain items]
| |
v v
[ios nsuserdefaults get] [Check protection classes]
| [Identify sensitive tokens]
v [Verify encryption at rest]
[List app sandbox files]
|
v
[sqlite connect *.db]
[Query sensitive tables]
|
v
[memory search "password"]
[memory search "token"]
[memory search "secret"]
```
## Workflow 4: Jailbreak Detection Assessment
```
[Attach Objection] --> [ios jailbreak disable] --> [Navigate app]
| |
v [App functions normally?]
[Hook detection methods] / \
[Monitor file checks] [Yes] [No]
[Monitor Cydia URL scheme] | |
| [Detection [Additional detection
v bypassed] methods exist]
[Document detection |
methods found] [Hook deeper: search
[Assess bypass for custom checks]
difficulty] [Frida script for
targeted bypass]
```
## Decision Matrix: Testing Approach
| Device State | IPA Access | Approach |
|-------------|-----------|----------|
| Jailbroken | Not needed | Direct Frida server + Objection attach |
| Non-jailbroken | Available | Patch IPA with `objection patchipa` |
| Non-jailbroken | Not available | Request IPA from client or use device management |
| Emulator | N/A | Limited: Frida on Corellium or similar platform |