Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

2.7 KiB

API Reference — Analyzing Android Malware with Apktool

Libraries Used

  • androguard: Python APK/DEX analysis — AnalyzeAPK(), permission enumeration, API call scanning
  • re: Regex extraction of URLs, IPs, base64 patterns from DEX strings
  • json: JSON serialization for analysis reports

CLI Interface

python agent.py sample.apk permissions
python agent.py sample.apk manifest
python agent.py sample.apk apis
python agent.py sample.apk strings
python agent.py sample.apk full
python agent.py sample.apk           # defaults to full analysis

Core Functions

analyze_permissions(apk) — Permission risk assessment

Calls apk.get_permissions(). Flags 20 dangerous permissions including SEND_SMS, READ_CONTACTS, BIND_DEVICE_ADMIN, BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE. Risk: CRITICAL >= 8 dangerous, HIGH >= 5, MEDIUM >= 2, LOW < 2.

analyze_manifest(apk) — Manifest component extraction

Calls apk.get_activities(), get_services(), get_receivers(), get_providers(). Returns package name, version, SDK levels, and all component lists.

scan_suspicious_apis(dx) — Suspicious API call detection

Searches DEX analysis for 14 patterns including:

  • Runtime.exec, ProcessBuilder.start — command execution
  • DexClassLoader.loadClass — dynamic code loading
  • Method.invoke, Class.forName — reflection
  • Cipher.getInstance — cryptographic operations
  • SmsManager.sendTextMessage — SMS abuse

extract_strings(dx, apk) — IOC extraction from DEX strings

Regex extraction of HTTP/HTTPS URLs, external IP addresses, and base64 strings. Filters out private IP ranges (10.x, 192.168.x, 172.16.x, 127.x).

detect_obfuscation(apk, dx) — Obfuscation indicator detection

Checks for single-letter class names (ProGuard), multi-DEX, native libraries.

full_analysis(apk_path) — Comprehensive malware assessment

Androguard API

Method Returns
AnalyzeAPK(path) (APK, list[DEX], Analysis) tuple
apk.get_permissions() List of Android permissions
apk.get_activities() Activity component names
apk.get_services() Service component names
apk.get_receivers() BroadcastReceiver names
apk.get_package() Package name string
dx.find_methods(classname, methodname) Matching method analysis objects
dx.get_strings() All strings from DEX files
dx.get_classes() All class analysis objects

Risk Scoring

Factor Max Points
Dangerous permissions (8 pts each) 40
Suspicious API calls (10 pts each) 30
External IPs (5 pts each) 15
Obfuscation detected 15

Dependencies

  • androguard >= 3.4.0
  • Isolated analysis environment recommended