mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 00:23:15 +00:00
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2.9 KiB
2.9 KiB
Active Directory ACL Abuse API Reference
ldap3 Python Connection
from ldap3 import Server, Connection, ALL, NTLM, SUBTREE
server = Server("192.168.1.10", get_info=ALL, use_ssl=False)
conn = Connection(server, user="DOMAIN\\user", password="pass",
authentication=NTLM, auto_bind=True)
# Search with nTSecurityDescriptor
conn.search(
"DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com",
"(objectClass=group)",
search_scope=SUBTREE,
attributes=["distinguishedName", "sAMAccountName",
"objectClass", "nTSecurityDescriptor"],
)
SDDL ACE Format
ACE String: (ace_type;ace_flags;rights;object_guid;inherit_guid;trustee_sid)
Example: (A;;GA;;;S-1-5-21-xxx-512)
| Component | Description |
|---|---|
A |
Access Allowed |
D |
Access Denied |
OA |
Object Access Allowed |
GA |
Generic All |
GW |
Generic Write |
WD |
Write DACL |
WO |
Write Owner |
Dangerous Permission Bitmasks
| Permission | Hex Mask | Risk |
|---|---|---|
| GenericAll | 0x10000000 |
Full control over object |
| GenericWrite | 0x40000000 |
Modify all writable attributes |
| WriteDACL | 0x00040000 |
Modify object permissions |
| WriteOwner | 0x00080000 |
Take object ownership |
| WriteProperty | 0x00000020 |
Write specific properties |
| ExtendedRight | 0x00000100 |
Extended rights (password reset, etc.) |
| Self | 0x00000008 |
Self-membership modification |
| Delete | 0x00010000 |
Delete the object |
BloodHound Cypher Queries for ACL Paths
-- Find all users with GenericAll on Domain Admins
MATCH p=(n:User)-[r:GenericAll]->(g:Group {name:"DOMAIN ADMINS@CORP.COM"})
RETURN p
-- Find WriteDACL paths from non-admins to high-value targets
MATCH (n:User {admincount:false})
MATCH p=allShortestPaths((n)-[r:WriteDacl|WriteOwner|GenericAll*1..]->(m:Group))
WHERE m.highvalue = true
RETURN p
-- Find GenericWrite on computers for RBCD attacks
MATCH p=(n:User)-[r:GenericWrite]->(c:Computer)
WHERE NOT n.admincount
RETURN n.name, c.name
-- Enumerate all outbound ACL edges for a principal
MATCH p=(n {name:"HELPDESK@CORP.COM"})-[r:GenericAll|GenericWrite|WriteDacl|WriteOwner|Owns]->(m)
RETURN type(r), m.name, labels(m)
-- Find shortest ACL abuse path to Domain Admin
MATCH (n:User {name:"JSMITH@CORP.COM"})
MATCH (da:Group {name:"DOMAIN ADMINS@CORP.COM"})
MATCH p=shortestPath((n)-[r:MemberOf|GenericAll|GenericWrite|WriteDacl|WriteOwner|Owns|ForceChangePassword*1..]->(da))
RETURN p
PowerView Commands for ACL Enumeration
# Get ACL for Domain Admins group
Get-DomainObjectAcl -Identity "Domain Admins" -ResolveGUIDs
# Find interesting ACEs for non-admin users
Find-InterestingDomainAcl -ResolveGUIDs | Where-Object {
$_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match "GenericAll|WriteDacl|WriteOwner"
}
# Get ACL for specific OU
Get-DomainObjectAcl -SearchBase "OU=Servers,DC=corp,DC=com" -ResolveGUIDs