sica-fondt/docs/plans/G3-defense-model.md
Claude 20e99f434c
docs/plans: remaining component specs — Identity, Cognition, Border, Storage, Periphery, Cross-cutting
Wave 1 remainder + Wave 2 design-first specs, completing one build plan per sub-organ:
- B1 tarot emulator, B2 SOUL/Big-3, B3 Celtic Cross
- C2 4+4 metacog, C3 inference cycle, C4 Brain
- D1 Ada border, D2 the medium, D3 mini-rag
- E1 3 GnuCOBOL invariant stores, E2 VARIANT stores, E3 RAG family
- F1 MoRAG, F2 SAE monitor, F3 subagents
- G1 stress-loop contract, G2 governance, G3 defense model

Each: contract + stubs for independent build; unfitted constants marked C1.

https://claude.ai/code/session_015hmgREHNsxYCuim33yUF2c
2026-06-13 20:08:19 +00:00

2.3 KiB

G3 — Defense model (cross-cutting · emergent)

1. Component

The two-layer defense, emergent from organs already specced — not new code. Layer 1 = semantic saturation (the Celtic-Cross token-flow, B3). Layer 2 = the Ada trust boundary (D1). This doc is the contract that says how they combine.

2. Status / certainty

C4 — both layers decided; layer 2 is WORKING (D1), layer 1 is the B3 draw used as armor.

3. Language & location

Realized by B3 (token-flow) + D1 (SPARK boundary). No new module; contract doc only.

4. Does / does-not

  • Does: push injection material down the attention gradient with meaningful content (the 10 accumulating cards), and structurally validate every crossing at Ada.
  • Does-not: flood noise (saturation is semantic); watch the Brain (central cut).

5. Interface contract

  • Layer 1 (B3): the iterative 10-card spread occupies context with meaningful symbol-material — "free armour when self-hosting" (tokens = owned-hardware cycles, not API cost).
  • Layer 2 (D1): blocklist (fetch→build→execute, base64 chains) · provenance on memory writes · no self-authority-reclassification · rate-limit escalation.
  • Threat corpus kept as study specimens only (prompts.json cryptojacking, HiFi_ProToCol authority reclass, gorkprotocol memory injection, THEORY.md hollow-math) — defended against, never built.

6. Dependencies & stubs

B3 (layer 1) + D1 (layer 2). Both stubbable independently; this contract just asserts they co-apply.

7. Invariants / laws

  • L1 (C4): defense is semantic saturation, not noise flooding.
  • L2 (C5): every crossing is structurally validated at Ada (D1 laws).
  • L3 (C5): threat specimens are a study corpus only — never a build target.

8. Build steps

  1. Ensure B3 accumulation actually fills context as designed (layer 1). 2. Ensure D1 admits/blocks per its laws (layer 2). 3. Keep the threat corpus quarantined as reference (e.g. reference/), not wired.

9. Tests

Layer 1: spread occupies the expected context share by final cognition. Layer 2: D1 trust_tests pass. Corpus: a static check that nothing under the threat corpus is referenced by a build target.

10. Open items

  • Where the threat-specimen corpus lives (reference/ archive). Measuring saturation effectiveness (C1).