The initial M-series specs were wrong (text digestion pipeline). Replaced
with the actual economy organ architecture:
M0 hub (independent system, scoped autonomy, multi-layered braking)
M1 Marketplace (multi-trader harness, deterministic law script, veto)
M2 Data Feeds (RSS + live market, bridges Marketplace ↔ Sims)
M3 Sims hub + 7 sub-specs (always-running, bounded predictions):
M3a statistical, M3b sociological, M3c AMM/liquidity,
M3d MEV/adversarial, M3e tokenomics/macro, M3f consensus/staking,
M3g market microstructure
M4 Wallets (sovereign custody, our keys only, 1:1 trader binding)
M5 Traders (AI actors, wallet-bound, all tool calls monitored)
M6 Conductor (supervisory AI, veto, pause/investigate, SAE intake)
M7 SAE monitor (trader surveillance, Brain-compatible message format)
Grounded in AMM invariant mechanics, MEV game theory, SDE tokenomics,
and evolutionary consensus games. Tax stub for Verschwörern Veregeister.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
3.9 KiB
M3d — MEV & adversarial extraction sims
1. Component
Maximal Extractable Value simulation: models transaction ordering as an optimization problem, Priority Gas Auctions (PGA) as all-pay auctions, and block building as a multidimensional knapsack problem. Pops here are searcher bots, block builders, and validators competing for extractable value. Grounded in ACM MEV game theory [3] and knapsack auction literature [4,5].
2. Status / certainty
DESIGN-FIRST · ABSENT. PGA-as-all-pay-auction model C4 (ACM [3]); knapsack formulation C4 (Cornell [4,5]); simulation parameterization C1.
3. Language & location
TBD · src/economy/sims/mev/. Needs combinatorial optimization (for knapsack) and continuous-time
auction modeling. Python (PuLP/OR-Tools for optimization), Rust, or Julia.
4. Does / does-not
- Does: simulate Priority Gas Auctions where multiple searcher bots compete for the same
arbitrage opportunity
Vby bidding gas feesgin a continuous-time all-pay auction; model block building as a multidimensional knapsack problem (scarce block space, heterogeneous transaction values/sizes); simulate endogenous selection cutoffs under paid-priority ordering; predict MEV exposure for proposed trades; produce bounded predictions on extraction risk and optimal gas strategies. - Does-not: extract MEV itself (this is a simulator, not a searcher); model AMM mechanics (M3c handles pool math); model social dynamics (M3b).
5. Interface contract
- Implements
query(PredictionQuery) -> BoundedPredictionper M3 hub. - Output bounds: extraction probability ranges and gas cost intervals.
Example:
{ value: 0.23, lower_bound: 0.11, upper_bound: 0.38, confidence: 0.80, time_horizon: "next_block", sim_type: "mev_adversarial" }— probability this trade gets sandwiched. Example:{ value: 14.7, lower_bound: 8.2, upper_bound: 22.5, confidence: 0.75, time_horizon: "next_block", sim_type: "mev_adversarial" }— optimal gas bid (gwei) for a given opportunity. - Prediction types:
sandwich_probability,frontrun_risk,optimal_gas_bid,block_inclusion_probability,mev_exposure. - Calibration: ingests
on_chain_event(mempool-like data) andprice_tickfrom M2.
6. Dependencies & stubs
- M2 Data Feeds — on-chain events and gas data; stub: canned mempool snapshots.
- M3 Sims hub — lifecycle management; stub: manual init.
- M3c AMM sims — pool state for arbitrage opportunity detection; stub: fixed pool state.
7. Invariants / laws
- L1 (C4): PGA is modeled as an all-pay auction — all bidders pay their gas whether they win or not. The sim must capture this cost structure (not winner-pays-only).
- L2 (C4): block building is a knapsack problem, not a queue — builders optimize for total extracted value subject to gas limit constraints, not first-come-first-served.
- L3 (C3): MEV exposure predictions are pre-trade — traders query this sim before submitting to the Marketplace to understand their extraction risk.
8. Build steps
- Implement the PGA all-pay auction model (N searchers, opportunity value V, gas bids).
- Implement the block-building knapsack solver.
- Add sandwich/frontrun detection heuristics.
- Wire M2 on-chain data → calibration of searcher population and gas dynamics.
- Wire pre-trade query interface for Traders.
9. Tests
All-pay: losing bidders still pay gas cost. Knapsack: builder selects optimal transaction set under gas limit. Sandwich: known sandwich-vulnerable trade flagged; non-vulnerable trade clear. Bounds: all outputs bounded. Pre-trade: query does not submit any transaction.
10. Open items
- Mempool data access (public mempool? private order flow?).
- Which MEV types to model initially (sandwich, backrun, liquidation, JIT?).
- Multi-block MEV (cross-block extraction strategies).
- Integration with M3c (arbitrage opportunities arise from AMM pool state).