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Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2.3 KiB
2.3 KiB
API Reference: Securing AWS Lambda Execution Roles
boto3 Lambda Client
Key Methods
| Method | Description |
|---|---|
list_functions() |
List all Lambda functions with role ARNs and runtime info |
get_function_configuration() |
Get function config including execution role |
update_function_configuration() |
Update function settings (role, KMS key, logging) |
create_function_url_config() |
Configure function URL with auth type |
boto3 IAM Client (Role Analysis)
| Method | Description |
|---|---|
get_role() |
Get role details including trust policy and permission boundary |
list_attached_role_policies() |
List managed policies on a role |
list_role_policies() |
List inline policy names |
get_role_policy() |
Get inline policy document |
put_role_permissions_boundary() |
Apply permission boundary |
simulate_principal_policy() |
Test effective permissions |
create_role() |
Create new role with trust policy |
attach_role_policy() |
Attach a managed policy to a role |
boto3 Access Analyzer Client
| Method | Description |
|---|---|
validate_policy() |
Validate policy against security best practices |
start_policy_generation() |
Generate least-privilege policy from CloudTrail |
get_generated_policy() |
Retrieve generated policy result |
check_no_new_access() |
Verify policy does not grant new access |
Trust Policy Structure
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Allow",
"Principal": {"Service": "lambda.amazonaws.com"},
"Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
"Condition": {
"StringEquals": {"aws:SourceAccount": "ACCOUNT_ID"}
}
}]
}
Permission Boundary Effect
The effective permissions are the intersection of:
- Identity-based policy (attached to role)
- Permission boundary (maximum allowed permissions)
- Service Control Policies (organizational guardrails)
References
- Lambda execution role docs: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/lambda-intro-execution-role.html
- Permission boundaries: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access_policies_boundaries.html
- Access Analyzer policy validation: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/access-analyzer-policy-validation.html