mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 16:40:24 +00:00
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
63 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
63 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
# Standards Reference: Container Scanning with Trivy
|
|
|
|
## NIST SP 800-190 - Application Container Security Guide
|
|
|
|
### Image Vulnerabilities (Section 3.1)
|
|
- Scan all container images for known vulnerabilities before deployment
|
|
- Establish organizational policies for maximum acceptable vulnerability severity
|
|
- Monitor images in registries for newly discovered vulnerabilities
|
|
- Maintain an up-to-date vulnerability database for scanning tools
|
|
|
|
### Image Configuration Defects (Section 3.2)
|
|
- Verify images follow CIS Docker Benchmark configuration guidelines
|
|
- Ensure images run as non-root users unless operationally required
|
|
- Remove unnecessary packages, shells, and utilities from production images
|
|
|
|
## CIS Docker Benchmark v1.6.0
|
|
|
|
### Image Level Controls
|
|
- 4.1: Ensure a user for the container has been created (maps to Trivy DS002)
|
|
- 4.2: Ensure containers use trusted base images
|
|
- 4.3: Ensure unnecessary packages are not installed in the container
|
|
- 4.6: Ensure HEALTHCHECK instructions have been added (maps to Trivy DS026)
|
|
- 4.7: Ensure update instructions are not used alone in the Dockerfile
|
|
- 4.9: Ensure COPY is used instead of ADD in Dockerfiles (maps to Trivy DS005)
|
|
|
|
## OWASP Docker Security Cheat Sheet
|
|
|
|
### Vulnerability Management
|
|
- Scan images in the CI/CD pipeline before pushing to registries
|
|
- Use `--ignore-unfixed` to focus on actionable vulnerabilities
|
|
- Implement SBOM generation for full component visibility
|
|
- Re-scan images on a schedule to catch newly published CVEs
|
|
|
|
### Dockerfile Security
|
|
- Use minimal base images (distroless, Alpine, slim variants)
|
|
- Pin base image versions with digest for reproducibility
|
|
- Run containers as non-root with explicit USER instruction
|
|
- Use multi-stage builds to exclude build tools from production images
|
|
|
|
## NIST SSDF (SP 800-218)
|
|
|
|
### PW.4: Reuse Existing, Well-Secured Software
|
|
- PW.4.1: Use automated tools to check for known vulnerabilities in dependencies
|
|
- Map to Trivy's OS package and language dependency scanning capabilities
|
|
|
|
### PS.1: Protect All Forms of Code
|
|
- PS.1.1: Store all forms of code in a code repository protected by access controls
|
|
- Container images in registries should be scanned and signed before use
|
|
|
|
## SLSA Framework Alignment
|
|
|
|
### Source Level
|
|
- Trivy filesystem scanning validates source dependencies before build
|
|
- Git repository scanning detects secrets and vulnerable dependencies in source
|
|
|
|
### Build Level
|
|
- Trivy image scanning validates the build output for vulnerabilities
|
|
- SBOM generation creates a verifiable bill of materials for the built artifact
|
|
|
|
### Deployment Level
|
|
- Admission controllers can verify Trivy scan results before pod scheduling
|
|
- Harbor registry integration enforces scan-before-pull policies
|