Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

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1.8 KiB
Markdown

# Standards Reference for Threat Modeling
## OWASP Threat Modeling Process
1. **Decompose the application**: Create DFDs showing data flows, trust boundaries, entry points
2. **Determine and rank threats**: Apply STRIDE per element, rank by DREAD or risk matrix
3. **Determine countermeasures and mitigations**: Map threats to controls
4. **Review and validate**: Peer review the model, validate against architecture
## NIST SP 800-154: Guide to Data-Centric System Threat Modeling
- Identify data assets and their sensitivity levels
- Map data flows through system components
- Identify threat actors and attack vectors targeting data
- Assess risk based on data exposure and impact
- Document countermeasures protecting data at rest, in transit, and in use
## ISO 27005 Risk Assessment Alignment
| ISO 27005 Step | Threat Dragon Activity |
|----------------|----------------------|
| Context establishment | Define system scope and trust boundaries |
| Risk identification | STRIDE threat enumeration per DFD element |
| Risk analysis | Severity rating and likelihood assessment |
| Risk evaluation | Prioritize threats by risk score |
| Risk treatment | Define mitigations (mitigate, accept, transfer, avoid) |
## STRIDE-per-Element Mapping
| DFD Element | S | T | R | I | D | E |
|-------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| External Entity | x | | x | | | |
| Process | x | x | x | x | x | x |
| Data Store | | x | | x | x | |
| Data Flow | | x | | x | x | |
## Threat Severity Rating Scale
| Rating | Score | Description |
|--------|-------|-------------|
| Critical | 9-10 | Immediate exploitation possible, severe business impact |
| High | 7-8 | Likely exploitation, significant business impact |
| Medium | 4-6 | Possible exploitation, moderate business impact |
| Low | 1-3 | Unlikely exploitation or minimal impact |