Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

63 lines
2.3 KiB
Markdown

# Privileged Account Access Review — API Reference
## CSV Input Format
The agent consumes a CSV file with these columns:
| Column | Type | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| `username` | string | Account identifier (SAMAccountName or UPN) |
| `owner` | string | Assigned account owner / manager |
| `roles` | string | Semicolon-separated privilege roles |
| `last_used` | string | ISO date `YYYY-MM-DD` of last interactive logon |
| `last_certified` | string | ISO date `YYYY-MM-DD` of most recent access review |
| `account_type` | string | `human`, `service`, or `shared` |
## Checks Performed
### Stale Account Detection
Flags accounts whose `last_used` date exceeds a configurable threshold (default 90 days). Accounts without a `last_used` value are automatically flagged as high severity.
### Shared Account Detection
Matches `username` against common shared-account patterns: `admin`, `root`, `service`, `svc_`, `shared`, `generic`, `temp`. Flags accounts matching these patterns that lack an assigned `owner`.
### Excessive Privilege Detection
Compares the `roles` field against high-risk role names: Domain Admin, Enterprise Admin, Schema Admin, Global Admin, Super Admin, Root. Any match triggers a critical finding.
### Recertification Compliance
Compares `last_certified` against a configurable interval (default 180 days). Accounts never certified are flagged as critical.
## Output Schema
```json
{
"report": "privileged_account_access_review",
"generated_at": "ISO-8601 timestamp",
"total_accounts": 150,
"total_findings": 12,
"severity_summary": {"critical": 3, "high": 7, "medium": 2},
"findings": [
{
"account": "svc_backup",
"issue": "shared_account_no_owner",
"severity": "critical",
"detail": "Appears shared (matches 'svc_') with no assigned owner"
}
]
}
```
## Compliance Frameworks
- **NIST SP 800-53 AC-2**: Account Management — periodic review of privileged accounts
- **CIS Controls v8 5.3**: Disable dormant accounts after 45 days of inactivity
- **PCI DSS 8.1.4**: Remove/disable inactive user accounts within 90 days
- **SOX Section 404**: Internal controls over financial reporting require access reviews
- **ISO 27001 A.9.2.5**: Review of user access rights at planned intervals
## CLI Usage
```bash
python agent.py --input accounts.csv --stale-days 90 --cert-days 180 --output report.json
```