mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
47 lines
1.8 KiB
Markdown
47 lines
1.8 KiB
Markdown
# API Reference — Performing Kubernetes etcd Security Assessment
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## Libraries Used
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- **subprocess**: Execute kubectl, etcdctl commands
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- **json**: Parse Kubernetes API resource output
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- **re**: Extract etcd server URLs from API server arguments
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## CLI Interface
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```
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python agent.py [--kubeconfig ~/.kube/config] encrypt
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python agent.py access --endpoint https://127.0.0.1:2379 [--cert client.crt --key client.key --cacert ca.crt]
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python agent.py secrets
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python agent.py tls
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python agent.py full [--endpoint https://127.0.0.1:2379]
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```
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## Core Functions
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### `check_etcd_encryption(kubeconfig)` — Verify encryption at rest
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Inspects kube-apiserver pod args for `--encryption-provider-config`, audit logging, TLS.
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### `check_etcd_access(endpoint, cert, key, cacert)` — Test access controls
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Uses etcdctl to check health and test for unauthenticated read access.
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CRITICAL finding if data readable without credentials.
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### `dump_secrets_check(kubeconfig)` — Audit stored secrets
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Lists all cluster secrets, categorizes by type, identifies sensitive naming patterns.
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### `check_etcd_tls_config()` — Verify TLS certificates
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Checks etcd pod args for peer TLS, client TLS, and client certificate authentication.
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### `full_assessment(kubeconfig, endpoint)` — Comprehensive security scan
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Combines all checks into single report with risk level classification.
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## Security Checks
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| Check | Flag | Risk |
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|-------|------|------|
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| Encryption at rest | --encryption-provider-config | CRITICAL if missing |
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| Client TLS | --cert-file / --key-file | HIGH if missing |
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| Peer TLS | --peer-cert-file / --peer-key-file | HIGH if missing |
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| Client cert auth | --client-cert-auth=true | MEDIUM if missing |
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| Unauthenticated access | etcdctl get without certs | CRITICAL |
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## Dependencies
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System: kubectl, etcdctl (etcd client)
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No Python packages required.
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