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sica-fondt/knowledge/cyber-skills/skills/performing-cloud-native-threat-hunting-with-aws-detective/references/workflows.md
Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure 
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

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AWS Detective Investigation Workflow

Phase 1: Triage

  1. Review GuardDuty HIGH/CRITICAL findings
  2. Open Detective console → Finding Groups
  3. Identify clustered findings pointing to same entity

Phase 2: Entity Investigation

  1. Select entity (IAM user/role, EC2, IP)
  2. Review 24h behavior timeline
  3. Identify unusual API calls, new geolocations, impossible travel
  4. Check for privilege escalation patterns (CreateAccessKey, AttachPolicy)

Phase 3: Scope Assessment

  1. Trace lateral movement via AssumeRole chains
  2. Check S3 data access patterns
  3. Review VPC Flow Logs for unusual outbound connections
  4. Identify all compromised credentials

Phase 4: Correlation

  1. Map findings to MITRE ATT&CK techniques
  2. Build attack timeline from entity profiles
  3. Identify initial access vector
  4. Document indicators of compromise (IOCs)

Phase 5: Response

  1. Preserve evidence (CloudTrail logs, flow logs, snapshots) when safe
  2. Disable compromised credentials
  3. Revoke active sessions
  4. Isolate affected resources
  5. If active impact is ongoing, contain first and document evidence trade-offs