Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

5.0 KiB

Reference: Cloud Log Forensics with AWS Athena

Athena Partition Projection

Partition projection eliminates the need for ALTER TABLE ADD PARTITION by automatically inferring partition values at query time based on declared ranges. This is critical for forensic tables that span long date ranges across multiple accounts and regions.

Key TBLPROPERTIES

'projection.enabled' = 'true'
'projection.<column>.type' = 'date|enum|integer|injected'
'projection.<column>.range' = '<start>,<end>'   -- for date/integer
'projection.<column>.format' = 'yyyy/MM/dd'     -- for date
'projection.<column>.interval' = '1'            -- for date/integer
'projection.<column>.interval.unit' = 'DAYS'    -- DAYS|HOURS|MINUTES|SECONDS
'projection.<column>.values' = 'val1,val2'      -- for enum
'storage.location.template' = 's3://bucket/path/${column1}/${column2}'

CloudTrail Log Structure

CloudTrail JSON fields relevant to forensics:

Field Description Forensic Use
userIdentity.arn Caller identity Attribute actions to actors
eventName API call name Identify suspicious operations
eventSource AWS service Scope investigation
sourceIPAddress Origin IP Detect external access
errorCode AccessDenied etc. Find unauthorized attempts
requestParameters API parameters Understand intent
responseElements API response Confirm impact
userAgent Client software Detect unusual tooling
tlsDetails TLS version/cipher Detect weak crypto

VPC Flow Log Fields

Field Type Forensic Use
srcaddr IP Identify source of traffic
dstaddr IP Identify destination
srcport INT Source port (ephemeral = client)
dstport INT Destination port (service identification)
protocol INT 6=TCP, 17=UDP, 1=ICMP
action STRING ACCEPT or REJECT
bytes BIGINT Volume of data transferred
packets BIGINT Packet count
start/end BIGINT Unix epoch timestamps
flow_direction STRING ingress or egress

S3 Access Log Fields

Field Forensic Use
remote_ip Source of S3 requests
requester IAM identity or anonymous
operation REST API operation (REST.GET.OBJECT, etc.)
key S3 object path accessed
http_status Success/failure indicator
bytes_sent Data volume exfiltrated
total_time Request duration

ALB Access Log Fields

Field Forensic Use
client_ip Source of web requests
request_url Full URL with potential injection payloads
elb_status_code ALB response (5xx = server-side issues)
target_status_code Backend response
request_processing_time ALB processing delay
user_agent Client identification

Forensic Query Patterns

Lateral Movement Indicators (VPC Flow Logs)

  • Internal-to-internal traffic on management ports (22, 3389, 5985, 445)
  • High connection counts between internal hosts
  • Unusual protocol usage (ICMP tunneling)
  • Traffic to honeypot IPs

Privilege Escalation Indicators (CloudTrail)

  • IAM policy attachment events
  • CreateAccessKey for other users
  • AssumeRole to high-privilege roles
  • ConsoleLogin without MFA
  • Security group modifications opening ingress

Data Exfiltration Indicators (S3 + CloudTrail)

  • Bulk GetObject from sensitive buckets
  • PutBucketPolicy making buckets public
  • CopyObject to external accounts
  • DeleteBucketEncryption
  • Large bytes_sent volumes from S3 access logs

Web Attack Indicators (ALB)

  • SQL injection patterns in URLs (UNION SELECT, SLEEP, WAITFOR)
  • Path traversal (../../, /etc/passwd)
  • XSS payloads (