mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 08:30:20 +00:00
24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
79 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
79 lines
2.0 KiB
Markdown
# ScoutSuite AWS Security Assessment Template
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## Assessment Information
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| Field | Value |
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|-------|-------|
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| Assessment Date | YYYY-MM-DD |
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| AWS Account ID | |
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| Assessor | |
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| ScoutSuite Version | |
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| Scan Scope | Full / Targeted Services |
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| Regions Scanned | |
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## Findings Summary
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| Severity | Count | Remediated |
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|----------|-------|------------|
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| Critical (Danger) | | |
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| Warning | | |
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| Passing | | |
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## Service-Level Findings
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### IAM
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- [ ] Root account MFA enabled
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- [ ] Password policy meets CIS requirements
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- [ ] No unused IAM users (>90 days)
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- [ ] No unused access keys (>90 days)
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- [ ] No inline policies on users
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- [ ] No wildcard (*) permissions in policies
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### S3
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- [ ] No publicly accessible buckets
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- [ ] Default encryption enabled on all buckets
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- [ ] Server access logging enabled
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- [ ] Versioning enabled on critical buckets
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- [ ] Block Public Access settings enabled
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### EC2
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- [ ] No security groups allowing 0.0.0.0/0 on SSH (22)
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- [ ] No security groups allowing 0.0.0.0/0 on RDP (3389)
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- [ ] EBS volumes encrypted
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- [ ] No instances with public IPs in private subnets
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- [ ] IMDSv2 required on all instances
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### RDS
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- [ ] No publicly accessible databases
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- [ ] Encryption at rest enabled
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- [ ] Automated backups configured
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- [ ] Multi-AZ for production databases
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### CloudTrail
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- [ ] CloudTrail enabled in all regions
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- [ ] Log file validation enabled
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- [ ] CloudTrail logs encrypted with KMS
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- [ ] CloudTrail integrated with CloudWatch
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### Lambda
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- [ ] No functions with public access
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- [ ] No secrets in environment variables
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- [ ] Functions deployed in VPC where appropriate
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- [ ] Execution roles follow least privilege
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## Remediation Plan
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| Priority | Finding | Service | Remediation | Owner | Due Date | Status |
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|----------|---------|---------|-------------|-------|----------|--------|
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| P1 | | | | | | |
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| P2 | | | | | | |
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| P3 | | | | | | |
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## Sign-off
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| Role | Name | Date | Signature |
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|------|------|------|-----------|
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| Security Assessor | | | |
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| Account Owner | | | |
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| CISO | | | |
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