mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
1.9 KiB
1.9 KiB
Workflows: AiTM Phishing Detection
Workflow 1: AiTM Attack Detection
User clicks phishing link
|
v
[Reverse proxy serves mirrored login page]
+-- Page loads assets from legitimate CDN
+-- SSL cert issued for lookalike domain
|
v
[User enters credentials + completes MFA]
|
v
[Attacker captures session cookie]
|
v
[DETECTION POINTS]
+-- Web proxy: Connection to newly registered domain
+-- Azure AD: Sign-in from proxy IP (unfamiliar location)
+-- Session: Cookie replay from different IP within minutes
+-- Exchange: Inbox rule created post-authentication
+-- Azure AD: New OAuth app consent
|
v
[Automated response]
+-- Revoke all sessions for user
+-- Require re-authentication with phishing-resistant MFA
+-- Remove suspicious inbox rules
+-- Revoke OAuth app consents
+-- Block attacker IP at firewall
Workflow 2: AiTM Incident Response
AiTM compromise confirmed
|
v
[Immediate containment (first 30 minutes)]
+-- Revoke all user sessions and tokens
+-- Force password reset
+-- Remove all inbox forwarding rules
+-- Revoke OAuth app consents granted post-compromise
+-- Disable compromised MFA methods
|
v
[Investigation (next 2-4 hours)]
+-- Review Azure AD sign-in logs for compromise timeline
+-- Check email sent items for BEC/phishing sent from account
+-- Review SharePoint/OneDrive access for data exfiltration
+-- Check for lateral movement to other accounts
+-- Identify all affected users (same phishing campaign)
|
v
[Remediation]
+-- Enroll user in phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2)
+-- Block phishing domain at email gateway and web proxy
+-- Retract phishing email from all mailboxes
+-- Update Conditional Access policies
+-- Notify all targeted users
|
v
[Post-incident]
+-- Add IOCs to threat intelligence
+-- Create SIEM detection rules for observed TTPs
+-- Update security awareness training
+-- Assess FIDO2 rollout for broader user population