mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
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Workflows - AD Vulnerability Assessment
Workflow 1: Comprehensive AD Security Assessment
Steps
- Run PingCastle health check to get overall AD security score
- Review PingCastle report for stale objects, privilege issues, trust problems, and anomalies
- Run SharpHound data collection against the domain
- Upload SharpHound data to BloodHound CE
- Execute critical BloodHound queries (shortest path to DA, Kerberoastable admins, delegation issues)
- Run Purple Knight for additional security indicator checks
- Consolidate findings from all three tools into unified report
- Prioritize findings by risk severity and attack path impact
- Generate remediation plan with specific PowerShell/GPO fix commands
Workflow 2: Attack Path Remediation
Steps
- Identify top 5 shortest attack paths to Domain Admin from BloodHound
- For each path, determine the weakest link (misconfigured ACL, session reuse, etc.)
- Remediate weakest links to break attack paths
- Re-run BloodHound collection to verify paths are eliminated
- Document remediated paths and remaining risk
Workflow 3: Privileged Account Hardening
Steps
- Export all members of privileged groups from PingCastle report
- Validate each account has legitimate business need for privilege
- Remove unnecessary privileged group memberships
- Implement tiered administration model (Tier 0/1/2)
- Enable Protected Users group for sensitive accounts
- Configure AdminSDHolder with correct ACLs
- Verify changes with follow-up PingCastle scan
Workflow 4: Kerberos Security Hardening
Steps
- Identify all Kerberoastable accounts from BloodHound
- Convert user-assigned SPNs to Managed Service Accounts (MSA/gMSA) where possible
- For remaining SPNs, ensure 25+ character passwords with rotation
- Disable DES and RC4 encryption for Kerberos
- Enable AES-256 encryption for all accounts
- Enable Kerberos pre-authentication for all accounts
- Configure constrained delegation to replace unconstrained delegation