Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

66 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown

# ModSecurity WAF Logging — API Reference
## Key ModSecurity Directives
| Directive | Description |
|-----------|-------------|
| `SecRuleEngine On/Off/DetectionOnly` | Enable/disable rule engine |
| `SecAuditEngine On/Off/RelevantOnly` | Configure audit logging scope |
| `SecAuditLog /path/to/modsec_audit.log` | Audit log file path |
| `SecAuditLogParts ABCDEFHZ` | Audit log sections to include |
| `SecRequestBodyAccess On` | Inspect request bodies |
| `SecResponseBodyAccess On` | Inspect response bodies |
| `SecRuleRemoveById <id>` | Disable specific rule by ID |
| `SecRuleUpdateTargetById <id> "!ARGS:param"` | Exclude parameter from rule |
## Audit Log Sections
| Section | Contents |
|---------|----------|
| A | Audit log header (timestamp, transaction ID) |
| B | Request headers |
| C | Request body |
| E | Response body |
| F | Response headers |
| H | Audit log trailer (rule matches, scores) |
| Z | End of entry marker |
## OWASP CRS Rule ID Ranges
| Range | Category |
|-------|----------|
| 911xxx | Method Enforcement |
| 920xxx | Protocol Enforcement |
| 930xxx | Local File Inclusion |
| 932xxx | Remote Code Execution |
| 941xxx | Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) |
| 942xxx | SQL Injection |
| 944xxx | Java/Spring Attack |
| 949xxx | Inbound Anomaly Score Blocking |
## CRS Paranoia Levels
| Level | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| PL1 | Default — low false positives, covers common attacks |
| PL2 | Moderate — adds more patterns, some tuning needed |
| PL3 | High — aggressive detection, significant tuning needed |
| PL4 | Extreme — maximum coverage, heavy tuning required |
## Configuration Example
```apache
SecRuleEngine DetectionOnly
SecAuditEngine RelevantOnly
SecAuditLogRelevantStatus "^(?:5|4(?!04))"
SecAuditLogParts ABCDEFHZ
SecAuditLogType Serial
SecAuditLog /var/log/modsec_audit.log
```
## External References
- [ModSecurity v3 Reference Manual](https://github.com/owasp-modsecurity/ModSecurity/wiki/Reference-Manual-(v3.x))
- [OWASP CRS Documentation](https://coreruleset.org/docs/)
- [CRS Tuning Guide](https://coreruleset.org/docs/concepts/false_positives_tuning/)