mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
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Standards and References - Runtime Security with Tetragon
Industry Standards
NIST SP 800-190: Application Container Security Guide
- Section 4.2: Runtime monitoring and anomaly detection for containers
- Section 4.4: Container-level network monitoring requirements
- Recommends kernel-level security monitoring for container environments
CIS Kubernetes Benchmark v1.9
- Control 5.7.1: Create administrative boundaries between resources using namespaces
- Control 5.7.3: Apply Security Context to pods and containers
- Control 5.7.4: The default namespace should not be used
MITRE ATT&CK for Containers
- T1611: Escape to Host -- Tetragon detects namespace manipulation attempts
- T1059.004: Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell -- process execution monitoring
- T1053.007: Container Orchestration Job -- detects unauthorized job creation
- T1496: Resource Hijacking -- crypto-miner detection and blocking
CNCF Landscape Positioning
Tetragon is positioned in the CNCF Runtime Security category alongside:
- Falco (audit-log and syscall-based detection)
- KubeArmor (LSM-based enforcement)
- Tracee (eBPF-based tracing)
Key Differentiators
- Kernel-level filtering reduces event volume before reaching user space
- Native enforcement (Sigkill/Override) without requiring separate enforcement engine
- Deep integration with Cilium for combined network + runtime security
- TracingPolicy CRD for Kubernetes-native policy management
Compliance Mapping
| Requirement | Framework | Tetragon Capability |
|---|---|---|
| Runtime threat detection | PCI DSS 11.5 | TracingPolicy with file integrity monitoring |
| Unauthorized process detection | SOC 2 CC6.8 | Process execution monitoring with namespace context |
| Container isolation enforcement | NIST 800-190 4.2 | Namespace escape detection and blocking |
| Audit trail generation | ISO 27001 A.12.4 | JSON event export to SIEM systems |
| Incident response automation | NIST CSF DE.AE | Real-time Sigkill enforcement on policy violations |