mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 16:40:24 +00:00
24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
19 lines
766 B
Markdown
19 lines
766 B
Markdown
# Standards - RBAC Hardening for Kubernetes
|
|
|
|
## CIS Kubernetes Benchmark v1.9
|
|
- 5.1.1: Ensure cluster-admin role is only used where required
|
|
- 5.1.2: Minimize access to secrets
|
|
- 5.1.3: Minimize wildcard use in Roles and ClusterRoles
|
|
- 5.1.4: Minimize access to create pods
|
|
- 5.1.5: Ensure default service accounts are not actively used
|
|
- 5.1.6: Ensure Service Account Tokens are only mounted where necessary
|
|
|
|
## NIST SP 800-190
|
|
- Section 3.4: Orchestrator security -- access control hardening
|
|
- Section 4.4: Countermeasures for orchestrator vulnerabilities
|
|
|
|
## MITRE ATT&CK
|
|
- T1078.004: Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts -- compromised service accounts
|
|
- T1098: Account Manipulation -- RBAC escalation
|
|
- T1069: Permission Groups Discovery -- enumerating RBAC bindings
|