mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 16:40:24 +00:00
24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
60 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
60 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
# API Reference: Implementing OT Incident Response Playbook
|
|
|
|
## ICS-CERT Incident Categories
|
|
|
|
| Category | Severity | Description | Response Time |
|
|
|----------|----------|-------------|---------------|
|
|
| Unauthorized Access | P1 - Critical | PLC/HMI/SIS unauthorized access | Immediate |
|
|
| Malware/Ransomware | P1 - Critical | OT network malware (EKANS, Triton) | Immediate |
|
|
| DoS/DDoS | P1 - Critical | OT communication disruption | Immediate |
|
|
| Network Intrusion | P2 - High | IT-OT boundary breach | < 4 hours |
|
|
| Reconnaissance | P3 - Medium | OT network scanning detected | < 24 hours |
|
|
| Policy Violation | P4 - Low | Unauthorized configuration change | < 72 hours |
|
|
|
|
## Purdue Model Containment Zones
|
|
|
|
| Level | Name | Containment Action |
|
|
|-------|------|--------------------|
|
|
| L0 | Physical Process | Manual control, verify SIS |
|
|
| L1 | Basic Control (PLC, SIS) | Isolate network, do NOT power off |
|
|
| L2 | Supervisory (HMI, SCADA) | Disconnect HMI, activate backup |
|
|
| L3 | Operations (Historian) | Isolate segment, preserve logs |
|
|
| L3.5 | DMZ | Sever IT-OT bridge |
|
|
| L4-5 | Enterprise IT | Standard IT IR procedures |
|
|
|
|
## NIST SP 800-82 IR Controls
|
|
|
|
| Control | Title | OT Consideration |
|
|
|---------|-------|------------------|
|
|
| IR-1 | IR Policy | Must address safety-critical systems |
|
|
| IR-4 | Incident Handling | Include OT engineering team |
|
|
| IR-5 | Incident Monitoring | Passive monitoring only in OT |
|
|
| IR-6 | Incident Reporting | CISA ICS-CERT within 72 hours |
|
|
| IR-8 | IR Plan | Separate OT and IT playbooks |
|
|
|
|
## SANS PICERL Framework for OT
|
|
|
|
| Phase | OT-Specific Actions |
|
|
|-------|---------------------|
|
|
| Preparation | Maintain PLC backup programs, define safe states |
|
|
| Identification | Correlate OT alerts with process anomalies |
|
|
| Containment | Network isolation without process disruption |
|
|
| Eradication | Restore from known-good PLC/HMI configurations |
|
|
| Recovery | Staged restart with operator verification |
|
|
| Lessons Learned | Update OT-specific TTPs and detection rules |
|
|
|
|
## Reporting Obligations
|
|
|
|
| Authority | Timeframe | Trigger |
|
|
|-----------|-----------|---------|
|
|
| CISA ICS-CERT | 72 hours | Critical infrastructure impact |
|
|
| Sector ISAC | 48 hours | Sector-relevant threat |
|
|
| TSA (pipeline) | 12 hours | Pipeline cybersecurity incident |
|
|
| NERC (electric) | 1 hour | Cyber Security Incident |
|
|
|
|
### References
|
|
|
|
- NIST SP 800-82 Rev 3: https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-82/rev-3/final
|
|
- IEC 62443-4-2: https://www.isa.org/standards-and-publications/isa-standards/isa-iec-62443-series-of-standards
|
|
- CISA ICS-CERT: https://www.cisa.gov/topics/industrial-control-systems
|