mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 16:40:24 +00:00
24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
58 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
58 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
# Standards and References - Kubernetes Network Policy with Calico
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## Industry Standards
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### NIST SP 800-190: Application Container Security Guide
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- Section 4.4: Container Networking - Isolate container network traffic using network policies
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- Section 5.3: Network Security - Implement micro-segmentation between containers
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- Recommends default-deny policies with explicit allowlisting
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### CIS Kubernetes Benchmark v1.8
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- 5.3.1: Ensure that the CNI in use supports Network Policies
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- 5.3.2: Ensure that all Namespaces have Network Policies defined
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- 5.3.3: Ensure that the default namespace does not contain any pods
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### NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5
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- SC-7: Boundary Protection - Implement network segmentation controls
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- AC-4: Information Flow Enforcement - Control network traffic between pods
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- SC-7(5): Deny by Default / Allow by Exception
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### NSA/CISA Kubernetes Hardening Guide v1.2
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- Section 3: Network Separation and Hardening
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- Use network policies to isolate workloads
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- Implement default deny ingress and egress policies
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- Limit pod-to-pod communication to minimum required
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## Calico Documentation References
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| Resource | URL |
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|----------|-----|
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| Calico NetworkPolicy | https://docs.tigera.io/calico/latest/network-policy/get-started/calico-policy/calico-network-policy |
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| Kubernetes Policy Tutorial | https://docs.tigera.io/calico/latest/network-policy/get-started/kubernetes-policy/kubernetes-policy-basic |
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| GlobalNetworkPolicy | https://docs.tigera.io/calico/latest/reference/resources/globalnetworkpolicy |
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| Policy Tiers | https://docs.tigera.io/calico-enterprise/latest/network-policy/policy-tiers/tiered-policy |
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| Calico eBPF Dataplane | https://docs.tigera.io/calico/latest/operations/ebpf/enabling-ebpf |
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## Zero Trust Network Model
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### Principles Applied
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1. **Never trust, always verify** - Default deny all traffic between pods
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2. **Least privilege access** - Only allow specific required communication paths
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3. **Micro-segmentation** - Isolate workloads at pod-to-pod granularity
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4. **Identity-based policies** - Use service accounts and labels for policy selection
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5. **Continuous monitoring** - Log and alert on denied traffic patterns
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## Compliance Mappings
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### PCI DSS v4.0
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- Requirement 1.2.1: Restrict inbound and outbound traffic to that which is necessary
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- Requirement 1.3.1: Inbound traffic is restricted to that which is necessary
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- Requirement 1.3.2: Outbound traffic is restricted to that which is necessary
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### SOC 2 Type II
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- CC6.1: Logical access security - Network isolation between components
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- CC6.6: Network boundaries - Restrict access at network boundaries
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### HIPAA
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- 164.312(e)(1): Transmission Security - Protect data in transit between services
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