mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
48 lines
1.7 KiB
Markdown
48 lines
1.7 KiB
Markdown
# API Reference: Implementing IEC 62443 Security Zones
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## Purdue Reference Model Levels
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| Level | Name | Assets |
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|-------|------|--------|
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| 0 | Process | Sensors, actuators |
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| 1 | Basic Control | PLCs, RTUs, safety controllers |
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| 2 | Area Supervisory | HMIs, engineering workstations |
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| 3 | Site Operations | Historians, OPC servers, MES |
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| 3.5 | DMZ | Data diode, patch server |
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| 4 | Enterprise | ERP, email, business systems |
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| 5 | External | Internet, cloud, vendors |
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## IEC 62443 Security Levels
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| SL | Protection Against |
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|----|--------------------|
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| SL1 | Casual or coincidental violation |
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| SL2 | Intentional violation using simple means |
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| SL3 | Sophisticated attack with moderate resources |
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| SL4 | State-sponsored attack with extended resources |
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## Zone Audit Checks
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| Check | Severity | Description |
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|-------|----------|-------------|
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| No SL-T defined | CRITICAL | Zone missing security level target |
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| SL gap (achieved < target) | HIGH | Controls below target |
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| No conduit controls | CRITICAL | Unprotected zone boundary |
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| IT-OT bypass DMZ | CRITICAL | Direct Level 4/5 to Level 0/1 |
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| Remote access without MFA | CRITICAL | Unprotected remote conduit |
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## Conduit Security Controls
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| Control | Purdue Boundary | Required |
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|---------|----------------|----------|
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| Protocol-aware firewall | L0-L1, L1-L2 | Yes |
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| Data diode | L3-DMZ | Recommended |
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| IDS/IPS | L2-L3, DMZ | Yes |
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| VPN + MFA | DMZ-External | Yes |
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### References
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- IEC 62443-3-2: https://www.isa.org/standards-and-publications/isa-standards/isa-iec-62443-series-of-standards
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- NIST SP 800-82: https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-82/rev-3/final
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- Purdue Model: https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2017/04/28/08_Didier_NICE-Workshop.pdf
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