mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
1.4 KiB
1.4 KiB
Workflows - Honeypot for Ransomware Detection
Workflow 1: Canary File Deployment
Start
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v
[Inventory all file shares] --> Map share names, paths, user population
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v
[Select canary file placement strategy]
|-- Root of each share (first files encrypted)
|-- Key subdirectories (finance, HR, executive)
|-- Alphabetically early names (!_, 000_, AAA_)
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[Generate canary files with realistic content]
|-- .docx, .xlsx, .pdf formats
|-- Realistic filenames matching share context
|-- Hidden attribute to prevent user interaction
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[Deploy monitoring]
|-- FSRM file screens for ransomware extensions
|-- FileSystemWatcher for canary file changes
|-- Audit logging on canary files
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[Integrate with SIEM and automated containment]
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[Test with controlled encryption tool]
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End
Workflow 2: Honeypot Alert Response
Canary Alert Triggered
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[Identify source IP and user from alert]
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[Automated containment (within 30 seconds)]
|-- NAC: Quarantine source IP
|-- EDR: Isolate endpoint
|-- AD: Disable user account
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[SOC validates alert]
|-- Check for legitimate activity (file migration, AV scan)
|-- If FP --> Restore access, tune alerting
|-- If TP --> Escalate to IR team
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[IR team assesses scope]
|-- How many canary files triggered?
|-- How many endpoints involved?
|-- Is encryption spreading?
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[Full incident response activation]
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v
End