Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

63 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown

# Standards & References: DMARC, DKIM, and SPF Email Security
## RFC Standards
- **RFC 7208 (SPF)**: Sender Policy Framework - authorizing sending hosts via DNS
- **RFC 6376 (DKIM)**: DomainKeys Identified Mail Signatures
- **RFC 7489 (DMARC)**: Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance
- **RFC 8301**: Cryptographic Algorithm and Key Usage Update to DKIM (mandates RSA 2048-bit minimum)
- **RFC 8616**: Email Authentication for Internationalized Mail
- **RFC 8617 (ARC)**: Authenticated Received Chain - preserving authentication through forwarding
- **RFC 7960**: Interoperability Issues between DMARC and Indirect Email Flows
- **RFC 6591**: Authentication Failure Reporting Using ARF
- **RFC 8601**: Authentication-Results header field
## NIST Guidelines
- **NIST SP 800-177 Rev.1**: Trustworthy Email - comprehensive email security deployment guide
- Section 4.3: Sender Policy Framework
- Section 4.4: DKIM
- Section 4.5: DMARC
- **NIST SP 800-45 Ver.2**: Guidelines on Electronic Mail Security
## Government Mandates
- **BOD 18-01 (CISA/DHS)**: Binding Operational Directive requiring all federal agencies to implement DMARC p=reject
- **UK NCSC Mail Check**: Mandates DMARC for government domains
- **Australian ASD Essential Eight**: DMARC listed as a mitigation strategy
## MITRE ATT&CK
- **T1566**: Phishing (all sub-techniques)
- **T1586.002**: Compromise Accounts: Email Accounts
- **T1585.002**: Establish Accounts: Email Accounts
## Industry Best Practices
- **M3AAWG DMARC Training Series**: Messaging Anti-Abuse Working Group deployment guide
- **DMARC.org Implementation Guide**: Step-by-step deployment methodology
- **Google Email Authentication Requirements (2024)**: Bulk senders must have SPF, DKIM, and DMARC
## SPF Syntax Reference
| Mechanism | Description | Example |
|---|---|---|
| `ip4:` | IPv4 address/range | `ip4:192.168.1.0/24` |
| `ip6:` | IPv6 address/range | `ip6:2001:db8::/32` |
| `include:` | Include domain SPF | `include:_spf.google.com` |
| `a` | Domain A record IPs | `a:mail.example.com` |
| `mx` | Domain MX record IPs | `mx` |
| `redirect=` | Use another domain's SPF | `redirect=_spf.example.com` |
| `-all` | Hard fail | Reject unauthorized |
| `~all` | Soft fail | Mark but deliver |
| `?all` | Neutral | No assertion |
## DMARC Tag Reference
| Tag | Required | Description | Values |
|---|---|---|---|
| `v` | Yes | Version | `DMARC1` |
| `p` | Yes | Policy | `none`, `quarantine`, `reject` |
| `rua` | No | Aggregate report URI | `mailto:reports@example.com` |
| `ruf` | No | Forensic report URI | `mailto:forensic@example.com` |
| `pct` | No | Percentage of messages | `0-100` (default 100) |
| `sp` | No | Subdomain policy | `none`, `quarantine`, `reject` |
| `adkim` | No | DKIM alignment | `r` (relaxed), `s` (strict) |
| `aspf` | No | SPF alignment | `r` (relaxed), `s` (strict) |
| `fo` | No | Failure reporting | `0`, `1`, `d`, `s` |