mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 08:30:20 +00:00
24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
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1.8 KiB
AWS IAM Permission Boundaries - Standards Reference
AWS IAM Policy Types
| Policy Type | Scope | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Identity-Based | Attached to users/roles/groups | Grants permissions |
| Resource-Based | Attached to resources (S3, KMS) | Cross-account access |
| Permission Boundary | Attached to users/roles | Maximum permission limit |
| Organizations SCP | Attached to OUs/accounts | Organization-wide limit |
| Session Policy | Passed during AssumeRole | Session-level limit |
AWS Well-Architected Framework - Security Pillar
SEC02 - Identity Management
- SEC02-BP02: Use temporary credentials (permission boundaries enforce this)
- SEC02-BP05: Audit and rotate credentials regularly
- SEC02-BP06: Employ user groups and attributes for fine-grained access
SEC03 - Permissions Management
- SEC03-BP01: Define access requirements (boundary defines maximum)
- SEC03-BP02: Grant least privilege access
- SEC03-BP06: Manage access based on lifecycle
- SEC03-BP07: Analyze public and cross-account access
CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark v3.0
- 1.4: Ensure no root account access key exists
- 1.15: Ensure IAM users receive permissions only through groups
- 1.16: Ensure IAM policies that allow full admin privileges are not attached
- 1.17: Ensure a support role has been created for incident management
- 1.22: Ensure IAM policies with admin access are reviewed regularly
NIST SP 800-53 Mapping
- AC-2: Account Management (boundary controls role creation)
- AC-3: Access Enforcement (intersection of policies)
- AC-5: Separation of Duties (boundary prevents security role access)
- AC-6: Least Privilege (boundary enforces maximum permissions)
- AC-6(1): Authorize Access to Security Functions
- AC-6(5): Privileged Accounts (boundary limits even admin roles)