mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
67 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
67 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: hunting-for-t1098-account-manipulation
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description: Hunt for MITRE ATT&CK T1098 account manipulation including shadow admin creation, SID history injection, group
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membership changes, and credential modifications using Windows Security Event Logs.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: threat-hunting
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tags:
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- threat-hunting
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- mitre-attack
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- t1098
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- account-manipulation
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- active-directory
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- persistence
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version: '1.0'
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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d3fend_techniques:
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- Token Binding
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- Restore Access
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- Application Protocol Command Analysis
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- Password Authentication
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- Biometric Authentication
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nist_csf:
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- DE.CM-01
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- DE.AE-02
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- DE.AE-07
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- ID.RA-05
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---
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# Hunting for T1098 Account Manipulation
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## Overview
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MITRE ATT&CK T1098 (Account Manipulation) covers adversary actions to maintain or expand access to compromised accounts, including adding credentials, modifying group memberships, SID history injection, and creating shadow admin accounts. This skill covers detecting these techniques through Windows Security Event Log analysis (Event IDs 4738, 4728, 4732, 4756, 4670, 5136), correlating group membership changes with privilege escalation indicators, and identifying anomalous account modification patterns.
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## When to Use
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- When investigating security incidents that require hunting for t1098 account manipulation
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- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
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- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
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- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
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## Prerequisites
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- Windows Security Event Logs (EVTX format) or SIEM access
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- Python 3.9+ with `python-evtx`, `lxml` libraries
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- Understanding of Active Directory group structure and SID architecture
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- Familiarity with MITRE ATT&CK T1098 sub-techniques
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## Steps
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### Step 1: Parse Account Modification Events
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Extract Event IDs 4738 (user account changed), 4728/4732/4756 (member added to security groups), and 5136 (directory service object modified).
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### Step 2: Detect Privileged Group Changes
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Flag additions to Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins, Administrators, and Backup Operators groups.
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### Step 3: Identify Shadow Admin Indicators
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Detect accounts receiving AdminSDHolder protection, direct privilege assignment, or SID history injection.
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### Step 4: Correlate with Attack Timeline
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Cross-reference account changes with authentication events to identify initial compromise and persistence establishment.
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## Expected Output
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JSON report with detected account manipulation events, privileged group changes, shadow admin indicators, and timeline correlation.
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