mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
68 lines
2.5 KiB
Markdown
68 lines
2.5 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: hunting-for-process-injection-techniques
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description: Detect process injection techniques (T1055) including CreateRemoteThread, process hollowing, and DLL injection
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via Sysmon Event IDs 8 and 10 and EDR process telemetry
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: threat-hunting
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tags:
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- process-injection
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- t1055
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- sysmon
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- createremotethread
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- dll-injection
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- edr
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- threat-hunting
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version: '1.0'
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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d3fend_techniques:
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- Executable Denylisting
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- Execution Isolation
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- File Metadata Consistency Validation
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- Content Format Conversion
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- File Content Analysis
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nist_csf:
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- DE.CM-01
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- DE.AE-02
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- DE.AE-07
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- ID.RA-05
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---
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# Hunting for Process Injection Techniques
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## Overview
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Process injection (MITRE ATT&CK T1055) allows adversaries to execute code in the address space of another process, enabling defense evasion and privilege escalation. This skill detects injection techniques via Sysmon Event ID 8 (CreateRemoteThread), Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess with suspicious access rights), and analysis of source-target process relationships to distinguish legitimate from malicious injection.
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## When to Use
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- When investigating security incidents that require hunting for process injection techniques
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- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
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- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
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- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
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## Prerequisites
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- Sysmon installed with Event IDs 8 and 10 enabled
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- Process creation logs (Sysmon Event ID 1 or Windows 4688)
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- Python 3.8+ with standard library
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- JSON-formatted Sysmon event logs
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## Steps
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1. **Parse Sysmon Events** — Ingest Event IDs 1, 8, and 10 from JSON log files
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2. **Detect CreateRemoteThread** — Flag Event ID 8 with suspicious source-target process pairs
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3. **Analyze ProcessAccess Rights** — Identify Event ID 10 with dangerous access masks (PROCESS_VM_WRITE, PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD)
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4. **Build Process Relationship Graph** — Map source-to-target injection relationships
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5. **Filter Known Legitimate Pairs** — Exclude known benign injection patterns (AV, debuggers, system processes)
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6. **Score Injection Severity** — Apply risk scoring based on source process, target process, and access rights
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7. **Generate Hunt Report** — Produce structured report with MITRE sub-technique mapping
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## Expected Output
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- JSON report of detected injection events with severity scores
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- Process injection relationship graph
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- MITRE ATT&CK sub-technique mapping (T1055.001-T1055.012)
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- False positive exclusion recommendations
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