Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

3.4 KiB

Detailed Hunting Workflow - LOLBins Execution Detection

Phase 1: Establish LOLBin Baseline

Step 1.1 - Profile Normal LOLBin Usage

index=sysmon EventCode=1
| where match(Image, "(?i)(certutil|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|msbuild|installutil|cmstp|bitsadmin|wmic)\.exe$")
| stats count by Image CommandLine ParentImage User Computer
| sort -count

Step 1.2 - Identify Standard Parent-Child Relationships

index=sysmon EventCode=1
| where match(Image, "(?i)(certutil|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32)\.exe$")
| stats count by ParentImage Image
| sort -count
| head 50

Phase 2: Hunt for Download Cradles

Step 2.1 - Certutil Download Detection

index=sysmon EventCode=1 Image="*\\certutil.exe"
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)(-urlcache|-decode|-encode|-verifyctl)")
| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage

Step 2.2 - Bitsadmin Transfer Detection

index=sysmon EventCode=1 Image="*\\bitsadmin.exe"
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)(/transfer|/create|/addfile|/resume)")
| table _time Computer User CommandLine ParentImage

Step 2.3 - PowerShell Download Cradles

index=sysmon EventCode=1 Image="*\\powershell.exe"
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)(DownloadString|DownloadFile|DownloadData|Invoke-WebRequest|iwr|wget|curl|Start-BitsTransfer|Net\.WebClient)")
| table _time Computer User CommandLine ParentImage

Phase 3: Hunt for Proxy Execution

Step 3.1 - Regsvr32 Squiblydoo

index=sysmon EventCode=1 Image="*\\regsvr32.exe"
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)(/s.*(/n|/i:))|scrobj\.dll|http")
| table _time Computer User CommandLine ParentImage

Step 3.2 - MSBuild Inline Task Execution

index=sysmon EventCode=1 Image="*\\MSBuild.exe"
| where NOT match(ParentImage, "(?i)(devenv|msbuild|visual studio)")
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)\\\\(temp|appdata|users|public)")
| table _time Computer User CommandLine ParentImage

Step 3.3 - Mshta Remote Execution

index=sysmon EventCode=1 Image="*\\mshta.exe"
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)(http|https|javascript|vbscript)")
| table _time Computer User CommandLine ParentImage

Phase 4: Hunt for Unusual Parent Processes

Step 4.1 - Office Applications Spawning LOLBins

index=sysmon EventCode=1
| where match(ParentImage, "(?i)(winword|excel|powerpnt|outlook|onenote)\.exe$")
| where match(Image, "(?i)(cmd|powershell|certutil|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|wscript|cscript)\.exe$")
| table _time Computer User ParentImage Image CommandLine

Step 4.2 - Web Server Spawning System Binaries

index=sysmon EventCode=1
| where match(ParentImage, "(?i)(w3wp|httpd|nginx|tomcat)\.exe$")
| where match(Image, "(?i)(cmd|powershell|certutil|whoami|net|net1|nltest)\.exe$")
| table _time Computer User ParentImage Image CommandLine

Phase 5: Correlate with Network Activity

Step 5.1 - LOLBin Network Connections

index=sysmon EventCode=3
| where match(Image, "(?i)(certutil|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|msbuild|bitsadmin|wscript)\.exe$")
| where NOT cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8", DestinationIp)
| table _time Computer Image DestinationIp DestinationPort DestinationHostname

Phase 6: Response Actions

  1. Block identified malicious URLs and IPs at proxy/firewall
  2. Isolate endpoint if active compromise confirmed
  3. Collect process memory dump for malware analysis
  4. Deploy targeted detection rules for observed patterns
  5. Update application control policies to restrict LOLBin abuse