Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

79 lines
2.5 KiB
Markdown

# API Reference: Hunting for Lateral Movement via WMI
## Detection Event IDs
| Source | Event ID | Description |
|--------|----------|-------------|
| Security | 4688 | Process creation (enable command line auditing) |
| Sysmon | 1 | Process creation with full details |
| WMI-Activity | 5857 | WMI provider loaded |
| WMI-Activity | 5860 | WMI temporary event consumer |
| WMI-Activity | 5861 | WMI permanent event consumer |
## WMI Lateral Movement Process Chain
```
Source Host: Destination Host:
wmic.exe --> WmiPrvSE.exe
process call create -> cmd.exe /q /c <command>
-> 1> \\127.0.0.1\admin$\__<timestamp> 2>&1
```
## Key Detection Patterns
| Pattern | Indicator | MITRE |
|---------|-----------|-------|
| WmiPrvSE -> cmd.exe | Remote command execution | T1047 |
| WmiPrvSE -> powershell.exe | Remote PowerShell via WMI | T1047 |
| cmd.exe /q /c ... admin$ | WMI output redirection | T1047 |
| Event 5861 consumer | WMI event subscription persistence | T1546.003 |
| wmic process call create | Direct WMI process creation | T1047 |
## Suspicious Child Processes of WmiPrvSE.exe
| Process | Risk Level | Context |
|---------|------------|---------|
| cmd.exe | High | Command execution |
| powershell.exe | High | Script execution |
| mshta.exe | Critical | HTA script execution |
| cscript.exe | High | VBScript/JScript |
| regsvr32.exe | High | COM object registration |
| rundll32.exe | High | DLL execution |
## Command Line Regex Patterns
```python
# WMI remote execution via cmd
r"cmd\.exe\s+/[qQ]\s+/[cC]"
# Output to admin$ share
r"\\\\127\.0\.0\.1\\admin\$\\__\d+"
# WMIC process creation
r"wmic\s+.*process\s+call\s+create"
```
## Sysmon Event 1 Key Fields
| Field | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| Image | Full path of created process |
| ParentImage | Full path of parent process |
| CommandLine | Process command line arguments |
| User | Account that created the process |
| ProcessGuid | Unique process identifier |
| ParentProcessGuid | Parent process identifier |
## WMI-Activity Log Location
```
%SystemRoot%\System32\winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity%4Operational.evtx
```
## References
- MITRE T1047 (WMI): https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/
- MITRE T1546.003 (WMI Event Subscription): https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/003/
- Detecting WMI Lateral Movement: https://imphash.medium.com/detecting-lateral-movement-101-part-2
- JPCERT Lateral Movement: https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/20170612ac-ir_research_en.pdf