mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 08:30:20 +00:00
24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
61 lines
2.3 KiB
Markdown
61 lines
2.3 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: hunting-for-lateral-movement-via-wmi
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description: Detect WMI-based lateral movement by analyzing Windows Event ID 4688 process creation and Sysmon Event ID 1 for
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WmiPrvSE.exe child process patterns, remote process execution, and WMI event subscription persistence.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: threat-hunting
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tags:
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- threat-hunting
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- lateral-movement
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- wmi
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- sysmon
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- mitre-attack
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- process-creation
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version: '1.0'
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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nist_csf:
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- DE.CM-01
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- DE.AE-02
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- DE.AE-07
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- ID.RA-05
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---
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# Hunting for Lateral Movement via WMI
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## Overview
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Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is commonly abused for lateral movement via `wmic process call create` or Win32_Process.Create() to execute commands on remote hosts. Detection focuses on identifying WmiPrvSE.exe spawning child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) in Windows Security Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event ID 1 logs, along with WMI-Activity/Operational events (5857, 5860, 5861) for event subscription persistence.
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## When to Use
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- When investigating security incidents that require hunting for lateral movement via wmi
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- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
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- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
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- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
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## Prerequisites
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- Windows Security Event Logs with Process Creation auditing enabled (Event 4688 with command line)
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- Sysmon installed with Event ID 1 (Process Creation) configured
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- Python 3.9+ with `python-evtx`, `lxml` libraries
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- Understanding of WMI architecture and WmiPrvSE.exe behavior
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## Steps
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### Step 1: Parse Process Creation Events
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Extract Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event 1 entries from EVTX files.
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### Step 2: Detect WmiPrvSE Child Processes
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Flag processes where ParentImage/ParentProcessName is WmiPrvSE.exe, indicating remote WMI execution.
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### Step 3: Analyze Command Line Patterns
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Identify suspicious command lines matching WMI lateral movement patterns (cmd.exe /q /c, output redirection to admin$ share).
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### Step 4: Check WMI Event Subscriptions
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Parse WMI-Activity/Operational log for event consumer creation indicating persistence.
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## Expected Output
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JSON report with WMI-spawned processes, suspicious command lines, WMI event subscription alerts, and timeline of lateral movement activity.
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