mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
68 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
68 lines
2.8 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: hunting-for-dns-based-persistence
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description: Hunt for DNS-based persistence mechanisms including DNS hijacking, dangling CNAME records, wildcard DNS abuse,
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and unauthorized zone modifications using passive DNS databases, SecurityTrails API, and DNS audit log analysis.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: threat-hunting
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tags:
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- dns
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- persistence
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- threat-hunting
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- passive-dns
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- dns-hijacking
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- subdomain-takeover
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- securitytrails
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version: '1.0'
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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nist_csf:
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- DE.CM-01
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- DE.AE-02
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- DE.AE-07
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- ID.RA-05
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---
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# Hunting for DNS-based Persistence
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## Overview
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Attackers establish DNS-based persistence by hijacking DNS records, creating unauthorized subdomains, abusing wildcard DNS entries, or modifying NS delegations to redirect traffic through attacker-controlled infrastructure. These techniques survive credential rotations, endpoint reimaging, and traditional remediation because DNS changes persist independently of compromised hosts. Detection requires passive DNS historical analysis, zone file auditing, and monitoring for unauthorized record modifications. This skill covers hunting methodologies using SecurityTrails passive DNS API, DNS audit logs from Route53/Azure DNS/Cloudflare, and zone transfer analysis.
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## When to Use
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- When investigating security incidents that require hunting for dns based persistence
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- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
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- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
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- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
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## Prerequisites
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- SecurityTrails API key (free tier provides 50 queries/month)
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- Access to DNS provider audit logs (Route53, Azure DNS, Cloudflare, or on-premises DNS)
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- Python 3.9+ with requests library
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- DNS zone file access or AXFR capability for internal zones
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- Historical DNS baseline for comparison
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## Steps
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### Step 1: Baseline DNS Records
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Export current DNS zone records and establish baseline for all authorized A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, NS, and TXT records.
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### Step 2: Query Passive DNS History
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Use SecurityTrails API to retrieve historical DNS records and identify unauthorized changes, new subdomains, and CNAME records pointing to decommissioned services (dangling CNAMEs).
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### Step 3: Detect Anomalies
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Compare current records against baseline to identify unauthorized modifications, wildcard records that resolve all subdomains, NS delegation changes, and MX record hijacking.
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### Step 4: Investigate Findings
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Correlate DNS anomalies with threat intelligence feeds, check resolution targets against known malicious infrastructure, and validate record ownership.
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## Expected Output
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JSON report listing DNS anomalies with record type, historical changes, risk severity, and remediation recommendations for each finding.
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