mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 08:30:20 +00:00
24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
74 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
74 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: hunting-for-anomalous-powershell-execution
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description: 'Hunt for malicious PowerShell activity by analyzing Script Block Logging (Event 4104), Module Logging (Event
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4103), and process creation events. The analyst parses Windows Event Log EVTX files to detect obfuscated commands, AMSI
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bypass attempts, encoded payloads, credential dumping keywords, and suspicious download cradles. Activates for requests
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involving PowerShell threat hunting, script block analysis, encoded command detection, or AMSI bypass identification.
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'
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: threat-hunting
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tags:
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- powershell
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- script-block-logging
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- event-4104
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- amsi
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- threat-hunting
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- evtx
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- obfuscation
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version: '1.0'
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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nist_csf:
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- DE.CM-01
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- DE.AE-02
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- DE.AE-07
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- ID.RA-05
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---
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# Hunting for Anomalous PowerShell Execution
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## Overview
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PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104) records the full deobfuscated script text
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executed on a Windows endpoint, making it the primary data source for hunting malicious
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PowerShell. Combined with Module Logging (4103) and process creation events, analysts can
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detect encoded commands, AMSI bypass patterns, download cradles, credential theft tools,
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and fileless attack techniques even when the attacker uses obfuscation layers.
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## When to Use
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- When investigating security incidents that require hunting for anomalous powershell execution
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- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
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- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
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- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
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## Prerequisites
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- Windows Event Log exports (.evtx) from Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational
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- Python 3.8+ with python-evtx and lxml libraries
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- Script Block Logging enabled via Group Policy
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- Understanding of common PowerShell attack techniques
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## Steps
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1. Parse EVTX files extracting Event 4104 script block text and metadata
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2. Reassemble multi-part script blocks using ScriptBlock ID correlation
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3. Scan script text for AMSI bypass indicators and obfuscation patterns
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4. Detect encoded command execution and base64 payloads
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5. Identify download cradles, credential dumping, and lateral movement commands
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6. Score and prioritize findings by threat severity
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## Expected Output
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```json
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{
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"total_events": 1247,
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"suspicious_events": 23,
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"amsi_bypass_attempts": 2,
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"encoded_commands": 8,
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"download_cradles": 5,
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"credential_access": 3
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}
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```
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