mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
synced 2026-08-01 08:30:20 +00:00
24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2.8 KiB
2.8 KiB
Docker Container Hardening Assessment Template
Project Information
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Application Name | |
| Docker Image | |
| Base Image | |
| Environment | Development / Staging / Production |
| Assessment Date | |
| Assessor |
Pre-Hardening Checklist
Dockerfile Security
- Using minimal base image (distroless, Alpine, scratch)
- Specific image tag with digest pinning (not :latest)
- Multi-stage build implemented
- Non-root USER instruction present
- COPY used instead of ADD
- No secrets in Dockerfile or image layers
- HEALTHCHECK instruction present
- Unnecessary packages removed
- setuid/setgid binaries removed
Daemon Configuration (/etc/docker/daemon.json)
- icc set to false
- TLS authentication enabled (tlsverify: true)
- Live restore enabled
- Userland proxy disabled
- no-new-privileges enabled
- Log rotation configured (max-size, max-file)
- Default ulimits configured
- Seccomp profile specified
Runtime Security Flags
- --read-only enabled
- --cap-drop ALL applied
- Minimum --cap-add for required capabilities only
- --security-opt no-new-privileges:true
- --security-opt seccomp=
- --memory limit set
- --cpus limit set
- --pids-limit set
- --user set to non-root UID:GID
- --tmpfs for writable directories
- --network set to custom bridge (not host)
- --restart on-failure with max retries
Host Security
- Separate partition for /var/lib/docker
- Docker group membership restricted
- Audit rules configured for Docker files
- Docker socket not exposed to containers
- Content Trust enabled (DOCKER_CONTENT_TRUST=1)
Vulnerability Scan Results
Trivy Scan
trivy image <image-name>
| Severity | Count | Action Required |
|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Immediate fix | |
| HIGH | Fix before production | |
| MEDIUM | Plan remediation | |
| LOW | Accept or fix |
Docker Bench Score
docker run --rm docker/docker-bench-security
| Section | Score | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Host Configuration | /10 | |
| Daemon Configuration | /10 | |
| Container Images | /10 | |
| Container Runtime | /10 | |
| Docker Security Ops | /10 |
Risk Acceptance
| Finding | Severity | Justification | Approved By | Date |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Remediation Plan
| Priority | Finding | Action | Owner | Target Date | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| P1 | |||||
| P2 | |||||
| P3 |
Sign-Off
| Role | Name | Signature | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Security Engineer | |||
| DevOps Lead | |||
| Application Owner |