mirror of
https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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24f816b6a3
Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
2.2 KiB
2.2 KiB
Standards and References - T1003 Credential Dumping Detection
MITRE ATT&CK Credential Dumping Sub-Techniques
| Sub-Technique | Target | Common Tools | Primary Detection |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1003.001 | LSASS Memory | Mimikatz, ProcDump, comsvcs.dll | Sysmon Event 10, EDR LSASS alerts |
| T1003.002 | SAM Database | reg save, Mimikatz | Registry access auditing |
| T1003.003 | NTDS.dit | ntdsutil, vssadmin, secretsdump | VSS creation + file access |
| T1003.004 | LSA Secrets | Mimikatz, reg save | Registry access to SECURITY hive |
| T1003.005 | Cached Domain Creds | Mimikatz, cachedump | SECURITY hive access |
| T1003.006 | DCSync | Mimikatz, Impacket | Event 4662 replication GUIDs |
LSASS Access Masks for Credential Dumping
| Access Mask | Meaning | Risk Level |
|---|---|---|
| 0x1FFFFF | PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS | Critical |
| 0x1F3FFF | Near-full access | Critical |
| 0x143A | Mimikatz typical access | Critical |
| 0x1F0FFF | Full minus synchronize | Critical |
| 0x0040 | PROCESS_VM_READ | High |
| 0x1010 | PROCESS_VM_READ + QUERY_INFO | High |
Protection Controls
| Control | Description | Effectiveness |
|---|---|---|
| Credential Guard | Virtualizes LSASS secrets | High -- prevents plaintext extraction |
| RunAsPPL | Protected Process Light for LSASS | Medium -- blocks unsigned callers |
| ASR Rules | Attack Surface Reduction for LSASS | Medium -- blocks common tools |
| LSASS SACL | Audit logging for LSASS access | Detection only |
| Windows Defender Credential Guard | Hardware-backed isolation | High |
Known Credential Dumping Tools
| Tool | Method | Detection Signature |
|---|---|---|
| Mimikatz | Direct LSASS read via API | sekurlsa::, lsadump:: |
| ProcDump | LSASS dump via MiniDumpWriteDump | procdump -ma lsass |
| comsvcs.dll | Built-in DLL MiniDump function | comsvcs.dll,MiniDump |
| Task Manager | GUI-based LSASS dump | taskmgr.exe accessing lsass |
| ntdsutil | IFM creation for NTDS | "ac i ntds" "ifm" |
| secretsdump.py | Remote NTDS extraction | Impacket network activity |
| LaZagne | Multi-source credential harvesting | lazagne.exe all |