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https://github.com/SHOGGOTH-SECTOR/sica-fondt.git
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Place useful parts of the surrounding repos into sica-fondt by layer, per the
body model (Ada = membrane; brain/endocrine/capabilities/knowledge non-Ada):
- brain/ LLM reasoning + providers (dapr, hermes, MoMoA)
- capabilities/ REPRAG sidecars: hermes tools/skills, dapr tools, parallel
dispatch, A51 channels, and the OSINT cluster
- knowledge/ LORAG corpus: 754 cyber-skills, agency personas, secure-coding,
MITRE ATT&CK data
- reference/ defensive threat-reference (C3, shhbruh doc) + AdaYaml parser
License handling: AGPL sources (worldosint, advanced_evolution, mercury,
Reticulum) and GPL DeTTECT are SPEC-only clean-room/port descriptions — no
copyleft code copied. MIT/Apache/data parts copied as working trees.
Safety: shhbruh escape/persistence material and C3 covert-C2 kept as reference
only, not wired into the running organism. See CONSOLIDATION.md.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01UehUqEXXJJCsHoA4voCU5c
64 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
64 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
# API Reference — Detecting Suspicious OAuth Application Consent
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## Libraries Used
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- **msal**: Microsoft Authentication Library — client credentials flow for Microsoft Graph
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- **requests**: HTTP client for Graph API calls with pagination
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## CLI Interface
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```
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python agent.py --tenant-id TENANT --client-id CLIENT --client-secret SECRET grants
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python agent.py --tenant-id TENANT --client-id CLIENT --client-secret SECRET apps
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python agent.py --tenant-id TENANT --client-id CLIENT --client-secret SECRET audit-logs
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python agent.py --tenant-id TENANT --client-id CLIENT --client-secret SECRET full --days 30
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```
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## Core Functions
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### `get_access_token(tenant_id, client_id, client_secret)` — MSAL client credentials auth
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Uses `ConfidentialClientApplication.acquire_token_for_client()` with scope
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`https://graph.microsoft.com/.default` to obtain a bearer token.
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### `graph_get(token, endpoint, params)` — Paginated Graph API GET
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Handles `@odata.nextLink` pagination. Returns aggregated `value` array.
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### `enumerate_oauth_grants(token)` — List delegated permission grants
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Calls `GET /oauth2PermissionGrants`. Parses scope strings, flags high-risk scopes.
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### `list_service_principals(token)` — Enumerate apps with verification status
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Calls `GET /servicePrincipals?$top=999`. Checks `verifiedPublisher` field.
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### `query_consent_audit_logs(token, days)` — Consent event audit trail
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Calls `GET /auditLogs/directoryAudits` filtered by `activityDisplayName eq 'Consent to application'`.
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Returns user principal, IP, target app, and result.
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### `analyze_risk(grants, service_principals)` — Risk scoring engine
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Scoring: +15 per high-risk scope, +25 for unverified publisher, +20 for AllPrincipals consent.
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Levels: CRITICAL >= 70, HIGH >= 50, MEDIUM >= 25, LOW < 25.
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### `full_audit(token, days)` — Comprehensive consent audit
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## Microsoft Graph Endpoints
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| Endpoint | Method | Required Permission |
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|----------|--------|-------------------|
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| `/oauth2PermissionGrants` | GET | `Directory.Read.All` |
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| `/servicePrincipals` | GET | `Application.Read.All` |
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| `/auditLogs/directoryAudits` | GET | `AuditLog.Read.All` |
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## High-Risk OAuth Scopes
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Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, Mail.Send, Files.ReadWrite.All, Files.Read.All,
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User.ReadWrite.All, Directory.ReadWrite.All, Sites.ReadWrite.All,
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Contacts.ReadWrite, MailboxSettings.ReadWrite, People.Read.All,
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Calendars.ReadWrite, Notes.ReadWrite.All
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## Risk Scoring
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| Factor | Points |
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|--------|--------|
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| Each high-risk scope | +15 |
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| Unverified publisher | +25 |
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| Admin consent (AllPrincipals) | +20 |
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## Dependencies
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- `msal` >= 1.24.0
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- `requests` >= 2.28.0
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- Azure AD app registration with `Application.Read.All`, `AuditLog.Read.All`, `Directory.Read.All`
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